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POLITICAL RECOLLECTIONS

RELATIVE

TO EGYPT.

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RELATIVE

TO EGYPT;

CONTAINING

Observations on its Government under the Mamaluks;—its Geographical Position;—its intrinsic and extrinsic Resources;—its relative Importance to England and France; and its Dangers to England in the Possession of France :

WITH

A NARRATIVE

OF THE

EVER-MEMORABLE BRITISH CAMPAIGN

IN THE SPRING OF 1801.

BY GEORGE BALDWIN, ESQ. ✓

LATE HIS MAJESTY'S CONSUL-GENERAL IN EGYPT;
AND ATTACHED TO THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF
DURING THE ABOVE GLORIOUS CAMPAIGN.

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CONTENTS



CONTENTS.

	Page
<i>Preface.</i> - - - - -	I

Speculations on the Situation and Resources of Egypt, &c.

CHAP. I.

<i>“ As to its Situation relative to other Parts of the Globe !”</i> - - - -	43
--	----

CHAP. II.

<i>“ As to its Commerce.”</i> - - - -	45
---------------------------------------	----

CHAP. III.

<i>“ As to its Productions, and Commercial Resources.”</i> - - - -	46
--	----

CHAP. IV.

<i>“ As to its Government.”</i> - - - -	47
---	----

CHAP. V.

“ As to its Means of Conquest.” - - 54

CHAP. VI.

*“ As to its present State, and aptibility
of Defence.”* - - - - - 57

CHAP. VII.

*“ As to the Importance of this Situation
to England, simply in subservience to
her Political and Commercial Corre-
spondence with India.”* - - - - 65

CHAP. VIII.

*“ As to the Importance of Egypt to
France.”* - - - - - 68

CHAP. IX.

*“ As to the Conquest of Egypt by
France.”* - - - - - 73

Letter to the Right Hon. Henry Dundas, one of His Majesty's principal Secretaries of State. - - - 81

Considerations for the Army, on an Expedition to Egypt, &c.

As to the Climate. - - - - - 103

As to the Disembarkation of the Army.

The Coast considered. - - - - - 106

Letter to the Right Honourable Sir Ralph Abercromby, K. B. Commander in Chief of the British Forces destined on an Expedition to Egypt. - 119

Essay on the Plague. - - - - - 125

Letter to John Baldwin, Esq. comprehending a Narrative of the British Campaign in Egypt, in the Spring of 1801. - - - - - 149

<i>Letter to the Right Honourable Henry Dundas, one of His Majesty's principal Secretaries of State, on the expediency of retaining Egypt under the controul of Great Britain. - - -</i>	209
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P R E F A C E.

THE presumption which might reasonably be ascribed to me, for presenting to the World, in so rude a state, the following Historical Recollections, will be acknowledged to be greatly attenuated in my motive to satisfy the publick curiosity.

For surely the publick curiosity must have been strongly excited by the late events in Egypt to know the cause, the interest the French could have in view, in invading a country almost forgotten to have held any rank in the annals of the world.

And, as certainly, upon reverting to the history of that singularly favoured por-

tion of our earth, all difficulty to assume a proper cause will disappear; and in it we shall discover the most imperious necessity upon England to frustrate, by every effort, their deep and dangerous design.

I had occasion to see it a great many years ago. It was my fortune, so early as February, 1760, to be landed on the Island of Cyprus; and from thence to attend to, and consider the wonderful resources of that still famous country. In 1763, I went over to Saint Jean d'Acri; and being there in nearer, and more frequent intercourse with its people, until 1767, I had occasion to contemplate the subject with that spirit of investigation which determined me to abandon all other my original connections and pursuits, to follow up the scene of adventure which opened in this investigation to my mind; and from which I am enabled to furnish the Reader with the

following, as some are pleased to think, interesting Historical Recollections.

I returned to England in 1768, and in pursuance of my scheme to explore first the connection there might be, of whatever nature, between India and Egypt by the Red Sea, I applied for and obtained leave to go as a free mariner to the East Indies.

But at the moment I was going to embark, accounts came from Cyprus of my brother's death, and I was advised to return to Cyprus on many accounts. I proposed at the same time to make a visit to Egypt; and from Egypt to embark on the Red Sea for Gedda; and from Gedda, by our annual Bombay and Surat ships, for the East Indies.

It was about the middle of 1773, before I could accomplish my purposes in Cyprus, and pass over into Egypt. I was at Grand Cairo in the time of Mehemed Bey: he gave me every sort of encouragement to persevere in my scheme: he told me, “If you bring the India ships to Suez, I will lay an aqueduct from the Nile to Suez, and you shall drink of the Nile water.”

It was not the season of departure from Suez for Gedda, and I was advised to go and make my plan known at Constantinople. I adopted this advice, and found almost every body in the mercantile order of men, very strenuously disposed to support me. Mr. Murray was then his Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople: his Excellency was disposed to think well of the undertaking; he gave me unequivocal proofs of it.

In March 1774, I returned to Egypt. I went to Suez. The country vessels were to sail every day, but were never punctual. Thirty days elapsed; my provisions were exhausted; my spirits impatient; the desert barren, indeed, of all resource! I wheeled about; I determined to return; I thought I should get to India sooner by the way of England; and the holy caravan passing by Suez at this time, on its return from Mecca, I mounted a Dromedary, and accompanied them to Cairo.

But while I was turning my back upon Egypt, an adventure, under the direction of Mr. John Shaw, was already in the Red Sea coming up to Suez from Bengal. I was scarcely arrived in London, before I was informed, by letters, of the arrival of this adventure at Suez. I resolved immediately to return to Cairo; I freighted a ship, and loaded her; I sent in a letter to the Court of Directors of the Hon. East

India Company, to inform them of my intention to settle at Cairo, and made an offer of my services, which was accepted.

I arrived at Alexandria in July 1775, and succeeded very prosperously in establishing a direct commerce from England to Egypt; the navigation from India quite up to Suez had been explored, and a fair prospect was opened of seeing my plan of establishing a commercial communication between Egypt and India equally successful. In 1776, 1777, and 1778, ships were arriving at Alexandra from England, and at Suez from India at the same time. We composed our bowl of the Ganges, the Thames, and the Nile, and from the top of the pyramid drank prosperity to England.

I had had the satisfaction also to convey

the first advices of the war in 1778 to the East Indies ; by means of which we were enabled, to the astonishment of all England, when the news arrived, to expel the French from India before succours could reach them, and to add their possessions to our own.

But a cloud of jealousy was at this time gathering over my scheme : the Turk, who had hitherto been silent, began to complain ; the Daganier, or custom-master, wanted a participation in the customs ; the sheriff of Mecca began to complain that the port of Gedda would be abandoned, and the cause of religion sustain an injury in its effects ; the Directors of the East India Company complained that their trade would suffer ; the Turkey Company cried out that they would be ruined. They had no conception of the tendency of these things ; they wrote to his Majesty's Ambassador at

Constantinople, and his Excellency officiated for its suppression at the Sublime Porte; the Sublime Porte, instigated, as the act avers, by his remonstrances, issued orders for the suppression of the East India commerce to Suez, in the following fulminating, and, by the late events, become most pertinent, most curious, but as to its political prejudices and precautions, most impotent Command.

COMMAND.

TRANSLATION *of* a HATTY SHERIFF,
or IMPERIAL (SIGN MANUAL) COM-
MAND, *addressed to the* GOVERNMENT
of EGYPT.

WE 'will not absolutely suffer frank ships to come to Suez, nor carry on any traffic, openly or clandestinely, between this town and Judda. The sea of Suez is

destined for the noble pilgrimage of Mecca. To suffer frank ships to navigate therein, or to neglect opposing it, is betraying your Sovereign, your religion, and every Mahometan. And all those who dare transgress will find their punishment in this world, and in the world to come. It is for the most important affair of state, and of religion, that this express and irrevocable command is issued. Conform to it with zeal and with activity, for such is our royal will.

To our honoured minister and illustrious counsellor, whose prudence, sagacity, and zeal directs the affairs of the world: who is the pillar of glory and of happiness; distinguished by the protection of the most high, our Vizir Ismael Pasha. May God perpetuate your splendour.

To the most upright of judges, and the best of Mussulman commanders, source of

learning and of perfection ; who is an honour to the laws and to justice, adorned by the favour of the Omnipotent, our Molla of Cairo. May God increase your dignities, and your virtues.

To the powerful and honourable commanders ; asylum of most illustrious suppliants : to whom is entrusted the execution of sovereign mandates, the Sheik Bel-lad, and other ruling Beys of Egypt. May God perpetuate your felicity.

To the most distinguished of all glorious personages, idol of the publick esteem ; our co-operator and commissioner, sent by our Sublime Porte, the Capigee Bachi, Mustafa Tahir Aga. May God perpetuate your glory.

To the most venerable Doctors. To the Sheriffs Vefagé, and Bekryé. To the

Chiefs of the Four Sects ; and to the Doctors of the Azhar. May your virtue be augmented.

To the Superiours of their Equals, the Captains, and renowned Officers of the Seven Agiaks of Cairo. May your power be increased.

Upon the arrival of this imperial command, Know ye that Suez is the port of Mecca and of Medina, whose glory may God perpetuate unto the end of the world. Cities illustrious for being the centre of all justice, and which give splendour to the law of the Prophet. There is no example that foreign nations, and the sons of error, have ever navigated in the sea of Suez. It has been a constant custom, until these latter times, for the English ships, and others who trade from India, to stop at Judda ; but in the time of Ali Bey, a small vessel

came up to Suez, and on board was an unknown person, with presents for Ali Bey, and declaring that he only came there for freight. The English have imagined, that authorised by such a precedent, it was lawful for them at all times, and all seasons, to return; and we have seen, in the time of the late Mehemed Bey Aboudahab, several vessels arrive there with cargoes of muslins, and other Indian articles. A principle of avarice betrayed this Bey also into error. They represented to him an infinite accumulation of revenue to his customs, and he was debauched. Under this specious pretext the English vessels, and those of other nations established in India, continued, one instigated by the other, to frequent the port of Suez; and the English went so far as to establish magazines. So it has been reported to us.

These facts and this innovation contrary

to the policy of our state, and dangerous to our religion, came to our imperial knowledge. We ordered, consequently, that the English thence forward should return no more to Suez, nor even approach to its coasts, having enjoined expressly *that they should be made to return*. We notified these our orders to the English Ambassador residing at the Sublime Porte, and required him to transmit them to his court. The answers which he received, as well from his Court as the East India Company, contained severe prohibitions to any of their subjects to come to Suez after the beginning of the Greek year answering to December, 1778. This minister, in communicating these prohibitions to the Sublime Porte, did at the same time declare, by the mouth of his first interpreter, that in case of contravention, the effects of those who should contravene might be seized, their vessels confiscated, the crews of the ships and the

supercargo imprisoned and condemned to perpetual slavery.

While the Sublime Porte was occupied about these matters, remonstrances relative to the same object arrived from Prince Surrou, Sheriff of Mecca. This Prince deposed, that the Franks, not contented to confine their trade to Indian articles, had also embarked on board their ships coffee and other products of Jemen, which they transported to Suez to the notable prejudice of the city of Judda. That these strangers, over-running lands and seas, take plans of every place, and preserve them until a propitious moment. Then fulfil their design of conquering the country. - That this having happened in India and other places, the Sheriff was justly alarmed for his own fate, and expressed the utmost inquietude and indignation.

All this has been confirmed to us by the doctors versed in history, whom we have consulted upon the matter. They have explained to us many events which have been brought about by the insidious policy of the Franks. We learn that in the year 900, the Portuguese, and afterward the Dutch, did by long and perilous voyages arrive in India. That they there described themselves as peaceable merchants, honest and inoffensive. These people were accompanied by men of learning; curious only they pretended of making useful and innocent researches. The Indians, a people of contracted genius, were the dupes of this appearance. Their principal cities, such as Ahmed, Abbas, Bengal, Banaras, Surat, and Madras have been the price of their credulity, and themselves are now under the dominion of these Franks.

It was by such like procedure, that in

the beginning of the year 400, and the time of the Fatimites, the Franks insinuated themselves into the city of Damascus. Their first disguise was as quiet honest merchants, who punctually paid the duties of custom. A dissension took place in those days between the Fatimites and the Abissides, and the Franks following their ordinary policy, availed of the occurrence to take possession of Damascus and Jerusalem, which they maintained for near a century.

Ufess Saladin of glorious memory, appeared about the middle of the year 607, at the head of an army of Jobite Courdes and Melouk Turks, and recovered Jerusalem and Damascus after most incredible labours, and a horrible massacre of the human species. But without dwelling upon the history of ancient times, no one is ignorant of the inveterate hatred which the Christians bear to the Turks, whom they

see with a jealous eye in possession of Jerusalem.

May God confound those in this world, and punish them in the next with an eternal punishment, who, constructing this evil to be a good, approve the coming of the Franks to Suez. Keep before your eyes the example of India. Consider the end of things and suffer not this intercourse. Seek out those who secretly assist them and punish them in such a manner as has no example, such as they deserve. You will not be permitted to alledge any pretence of justification. Imprison the captains of the Frank vessels, and, above all, the English, upon their coming to Suez, and seize their ships, for it is set forth in the memorial of the English Ambassador, in the answers from his Court, and in the verbal information of his first interpreter, that they are pirates and rebels to their Sovereign. They

are such to my Sublime Porte, and *as such* they merit imprisonment, and the confiscation of their goods. You will give advice of your proceedings to the Sublime Porte, and we will decide without permitting any one to intercede for their deliverance.

You, Vizir, already mentioned ; know ye, that such is the will and pleasure of the Sublime Porte. The intimate part you have had in the administration of our government sufficiently apprises you of the importance of this object. You, Molla, commanding Beys, Doctors, and Ogiacks, take proper warning. We recommend to you expressly and reiterately to watch with attention this innovation so dangerous to the state, and to religion. Conform, therefore, exactly to our command, and let our voice inspire you with a due fear—If not—by God we swear, that you will incur our

indignation, and the severest punishments shall be the fruits of it. You who are enlightened by the Mussulman religion : you who are profound in history and the study of books, applaud these our orders—and if your counsel for their execution prevail not—inform the Sublime Porte of the cause and consequence.

The attention of the Reader will be a little halted by this extraordinary Command, and carrying in his mind the recent events of Egypt, will be apt to exclaim : “ the Turk was not then so very far out in his suspicions about these Franks, and in as much as the severity of this Command may have been not only necessary, but efficient to the purpose of his own preservation, the ruin which was consequent upon the actors in the commerce so horribly

anathamaed by it, will seem by the event to be perfectly justified."

So it would, if the designs so attributed to the peaceable and innoſſenſive merchants had been ſtopt by the execution of the Command; but the events prove the contrary. The fall of an empire is to be looked for in the defects of its government, not in the deſigns of ſuch as perceive their defects. The ſafety of an empire is in its ſtrength, not in menaces, or threats, or perpetrations of violence againſt ſuch as, having eyes, cannot miſs ſeeing their defects. The weakneſs of an empire is in the principle of its government, or in the bad adminiſtration of its laws. The deſigns of the merchants did not make the weakneſs; they could only repreſent it. To ſay that their weakneſs is cured, by putting out the eyes of a few beholders, is

weakness to cure weakness—pitiful indeed ! An empire in vigour of power and vigilance of administration, can have nothing to fear from the designs of merchants : a good constitution will guard itself from designs. It may be good policy to let in our neighbours to observe us ; to observe our strength and vigilance of administration : it may awe their attempts. It may be good policy to keep alive a jealousy of our neighbours, by calling them in to observe us. If we are afraid to be observed, I should dread more from our intrinsic malady than from any attempt of an external enemy upon our strength.

It is one of the prerogatives of a popular government ; I mean to say of our own government, which is popular to the full effect of every good purpose, to publish its strength and condition to the world. Let our enemy know it : that we knowing our

security, may confide in it; or knowing our danger, may concur in the necessity of arming against it. He is a dangerous minister who would conceal our weakness from us. There can be no security in deception. Nothing is so dangerous as a sense of security, where there is weakness underneath.

These were the drawings I took from very cursory observations, but on strong and prominent features of the Turkish power at various times and seasons, beginning in the year 1760, until the execution of this Command. I concluded as I saw a man consumptive, that he would finally die of his consumption. If I saw his estate neglected, and the fences wasting away, I would say, the pigs will get into this estate. I may have represented this weakness, but I did not make it. I saw from my visits into Egypt, that the situa-

tion was pregnant of infinite advantage to England, both as to commercial and political design. I meant no more, indeed, than commerce; but I saw that that commerce would subserve to great political designs.

I prosecuted my scheme, and offered by letter, in 1775, to the Court of Directors, to serve their interests in the event of a sudden war, by apprising their settlements; and I executed my proposition. The French have been twice expelled from India, in less than three months after the declaration of the war, by an effect of my advices from Egypt. Perhaps, as a consequence of these exertions, I may have been a principal in producing the late events in Egypt.

The French were very fore at the effect of my despatches from Egypt. It was

treating them with an alacrity which rather surprised them. They began to examine what Egypt might be worth to France. I had seen it, and were the French not to see it? They sent Commandant de Truguet, in 1785, to conclude a treaty with the Beys of Egypt: he succeeded. Upon his return to Paris, the French were so captivated by his report as to meditate the conquest of Egypt.

Government was informed of these things: they sent for me. I had been in England from the beginning of the year 1781; plundered by the execution of that damnable Command; plundered afterwards, on the plains of Antioch, by thieves; shot through the right arm, destitute, and petitioning for justice. I received a summon from Mr. Dundas to attend the India Board, and I attended. Mr. Dundas informed me of the intelligence which had been received,

and asked me what I thought of it. - I answered, that I thought much of it; and so discussing the question for some time, he concluded with desiring that I would take the matter into my serious consideration, and view it in all its bearings: to say, “as to its geographical relations; as to its intrinsic and extrinsic resources; as to its means of defence; as to its importance to France; as to its danger to England, &c. &c. &c.; and to draw up, and present to the Board, a Memorial thereupon.

This injunction from Mr. Dundas, produced the Memorial presented to the Reader at the head of these Historical Recollections, entitled Speculations on the Situation and Resources of Egypt: and on which his Majesty's Ministers were induced to advise his Majesty to send a Consul-General to Egypt; and nominally recommending the Writer as fit to be entrusted with the business of observ-

ing, from that position, the motions of the French, and of keeping our settlements in India advised for their better security and government.

I was soon after honoured with his Majesty's commission and command to repair to my post; and on the 18th of December 1786, I had entered on the functions of my office at Alexandria.

Gázee Haffan Pasha, High Admiral of the Porte, commanding an army, was at Cairo, purposely sent by his Sublime Highness the Grand Senior, to chastise the excessive insolence and tyranny of the Mamaluks towards the Franks; who, oppressed by some peculiar enormity, had united in one common complaint to obtain redress or better protection for the future.

I considered this circumstance as in-

volving higher consequences ; and the letters are extant in which I observed upon this occasion—That knowing how much the fate of empires depends on the character and energies of particular men ; that knowing how essentially the Turkish empire was upheld by the countenance of this particular man, I was apprehensive that some neighbouring power might take advantage of his absence and great distance from the capital to revive their grievances ; and engaged as he was in an enterprize which might put his famed invincibility to hazard, rekindle a war which, without great and powerful aid from friends, might bring the already enfeebled existence of the Turkish empire into danger of total dissolution.

And that this war did arise from these considerations is known ; and that England came forward with her aid, effectually to save the Turkish empire from immediate

ruin. But opposed ; but wanting the force and effect of popular opinion, so necessary in a government like ours, was compelled to abandon our plan ; and falling so far short of the full extent and operation of our policy, could accomplish no more ; could only put off the evil day.

Gazee Hassan Pasha was recalled from Egypt, to take the command and direction of the war against the Russians. He sighed, as I saw him upon taking leave, and said--Consul, I am disgraced ! He died in his camp.

I was observing, as the time revolved, the revolutions it brought in its career. I saw the disorders and convulsions of France tending to the consequences we have seen. I was attentive to the impending moment of unavoidable war. It happened, and I conveyed the account of it so early to India

as to enable the Governor General (as he professes candidly to have done upon the credit of my report) to expel the French from India, and to decide the fate of the war in that country a second time, to the great honour and incalculable advantage of England.

In 1796, I was apprised of the departure of the Dutch squadron from the Texel, bound, with troops, to the Cape of Good Hope; and I had the good fortune to transmit this intelligence to Admiral Elphinstone to India, in time to enable the squadron to return to the Cape, and to capture the Dutch squadron, and to save that valuable conquest to our country.

In 1796, I had to counteract a publick mission entrusted to the agency of Tinville, brother to the notorious Public Accuser, Tinville, who was arrived in Cairo expressly

to inveigle the Beys of Egypt into the designs of the French, and particularly to obtain consent to their project of passing an army through Egypt, to the East Indies, by the Red Sea, in order to strengthen Tippoo, and finally to annihilate the British dominion in the East Indies: and I did counteract it. Tinville is known to have said, upon his return to Alexandria disappointed, “*Ils ne nous veulent pas de gré, ils nous auront de force.*” “*Mais, comment ferez vous pour embarquer vos troupes sur la Mer Rouge?*” “*Nous y transporterons des vaisseaux en charpente.*” It appeared here, that the Republicans were bent at this time upon the invasion of Egypt. Perhaps the term of passing to India, was only a pretext to get easier possession of Egypt, as a prelude to the rest. One would not think that this was a time to withdraw our attention from Egypt; to abolish even the office which was appointed

especially to watch over this their so long precognized design !

It is, however, true, that about this time I received an official letter, informing me, that his Majesty, even four years before, had been advised, that the Office of Consul in Egypt was become unnecessary, and that of course the office from that time had been abolished.

The Reader will rather suspect, from the improbability of the thing, that the letter must have been a forgery ; so inconsistent was it with the real exigency of the case ; the world will hardly believe it ; I do not possess the letter to prove it ; but true it is, such a letter came ; and that its effects were to depress me to such a degree, as to bereave me of my strength, and of every faculty to attend to any earthly concern. I was advised to embark for another

climate. I left all my property of every kind behind me: I sailed on the 14th of March 1798, and on the 19th was landed happily on the Island of Patmos, in the Grotto of the Revelations.

The Reader is informed how soon after Nelson appeared off Alexandria in search of the French; how he missed them; how Bonaparte uninterruptedly landed, and as instantly made a conquest of that devoted country. He is now informed how I missed them! Shall not I thank the author of that letter which made me sick, for being the cause of my eluding them? I do thank the Author of all Being for every event of my life! Do we know by what secret laws the world is governed? Nous reculons pour mieux sauter!

From Patmos, I went to Chismé. The

Reader will remember Chismé, for being the sepulchre of the Turkish fleet! I was detained here five and twenty days. The Greeks would come round me every night, and dance the Carmagnole. The Turks were all contaminated: they would beg God's blessing on the arms of Paswan Oglû, the rebel: they were tired of their condition, they said; it was time to be men.

I went on to Trieste. I would have gone on to England; but hearing here of the invasion of Egypt, and the confiscation of all my property, I could not meet the expence of England without inconvenience. I resolved, therefore, to retire from society into a corner of Italy, and to wait for a turn in the tide of affairs. I took my route by Vienna; and here, discoursing with the Baron de Thugut, who from a very old date, has honoured me with his

esteem, I explained to him the precipice to which the very throne of Constantinople was exposed in the danger of Acri. The Publick is not aware, perhaps, of the extent of that danger, and of the service done to their country by the gallant handful of men who defended that place, and forced the flower of France to retreat. He saw and understood the danger, and applauded my conception and observation of these things: he saw in the representation of this danger realized to his mind, another train of dangers rolling, and accumulating as they roll along, more serious to the cause of order and of government than any thing before attempted. Bonaparte alluded to it upon his return to France, when addressing the Council from his usurped throne. He said to them, “ Now *beginneth* the æra of revolutions ;” making light, in comparison of what he had to do, of all that had been done before. It was by this unbounded

display of enterprize, of victory, of conquest, that he won the army to his cause. Mr. de Thugut appeared to me to have considered it with attention; he appeared to me to have understood it in its magnitude; he appears to me to have adapted himself to the policy which it imposed!

I left Vienna to proceed to my retirement. I arrived in Tuscany soon after the Battle of the Trebia; and found to lodge myself in a palace elegantly furnished, in the neighbourhood of Florence, at the low price of 20*l.* a year. I could be resigned to this fate, since the owner of the palace had to resign himself to worse. I clothed myself, amid this splendour, in perfect humility: I would have clothed myself in peace, but the din of war was all around me. Mantua, Tortona, Alexandria, Coni, Genoa; and the sudden reverse of all this, obtained at one blow, by the battle of Marengo. Won-

derful in the history of events ! Obtained by the singular valour of d'Essaix : d'Essaix, released by the convention of el Arish, made captive by the cruizers of Lord Keith, is a prisoner in the Lazaretto of Leghorn when Bonaparte had descended the Alps, is released just in time to join the army, to receive his commission, and to conquer ; for it was d'Essaix who recovered the palm ! it was d'Essaix who conquered at Marengo !

This was the only fruit of the convention of el Arish : he gave his life for his victory. And what is memorable, he fell in the same hour of time that Kleber was assassinated in Egypt. I do not dwell upon this curious combination of events.

This battle of Marengo disturbed me again from my solitude. I saw its consequences, and retreated to the neighbour-

hood of Leghorn. It was my lot to be surprised soon after by the arrival of a party of Republicans in the city; and I had just time to save myself on board of his Majesty's frigate Santa Dorothea, with little more than a change of linen in my wallet. Captain Downman received me, as he did every body in the same situation, with great affability and kindness. The Duke d'Aosta, with his family and suite, had occupied the cabin, and Captain Downman himself was intermixed with the crowd of fugitives in the ward-room, cheerfully adapting himself to the severity of the case. I take a pride in mentioning his friendly and generous conduct to all his visitors, upon this disagreeable occasion.

After cruising about for a fortnight with the Santa Dorothea, I was at length landed at Naples. But Naples did not seem to afford any better security from the

visitation of the common perturbator of mankind, than the country we had fled from. The populace, however, were disposed to defend their rights; they only wanted an English force to support them: they appeared to expect it with confidence: they were only undeceived upon the arrival of a cutter, with letters from the Commanders in Chief of the army and navy, telling me that they were going on an expedition to Egypt, and deeming the knowledge and experience I might possess of that country, essential to the publick service, they requested that I should join them at Malta.

Shall I make a merit of my readiness to embark upon such an invitation? or shall I not rather say—What answer could an honest Englishman, and a faithful subject, make to so honourable a call—to so honourable a distinction—but, command! I will shew the way?

Here I enter upon my campaign. The Reader will peruse, at all events, in the following pages, effusions of an arduous and patriotic turn of mind : he will see that I had calculated upon the invasion of Egypt sixteen years ago, as much from the ordinary fluctuations in the tide of Power, as from the natural avidity of power in the bosoms of men. As the tide ebbs on one side, it must necessarily flow on the other. I consider Egypt as conquered by the arms of England. I have attempted to do justice to the brave soldiers who conquered it. It is a question now, whether we should keep it? That we should keep it, appears to me to be a matter of necessity : that we ought to keep it, is to be seen in its worth ; in its importance to the commerce ; and in that, to all the other interests of the state.

SPECULATIONS
ON THE
SITUATION AND RESOURCES
OF
EGYPT:

FROM OBSERVATIONS BEGAN IN 1773,
AND
CONTINUED, AS OPPORTUNITIES FAVOURED,
UNTIL THE YEAR 1781.

THESE REFLECTIONS THROWN TOGETHER
IN THE YEAR 1785.

SPECULATIONS
ON THE
SITUATION AND RESOURCES
OF
EGYPT, ETC.

CHAP. I.

“ AS TO ITS SITUATION RELATIVE TO OTHER
PARTS OF THE GLOBE ! ”

EGYPT communicates with the coasts of Syria, Caramania, Natolia, and the coasts of the Black Sea ; with the coasts of Greece, of Italy, and France ; with the coasts of Spain, the northern coast of Africa, and all the islands of the Mediterranean, in a space of twenty days : it communicates with the coasts of Arabia Felix, of the gulphs of Persia and Bengal, the Eastern coasts of Africa, Madagascar, and the Cape of Good Hope, in forty days ; with the coasts of

Sumatra, Java, Japan, and China; the Philippines, the coasts of Brazil, and great part of America; with all the interior parts of Asia, Africa, and Europe, in ninety days: it approaches England to her possessions in the East Indies, by a communication of sixty days; and in one hundred days may send her tidings to the farthest corners of the earth.

These things are not merely possible, but from natural causes, providentially and periodically revolving, often practicable and certain.

CHAP. II.

“ AS TO ITS COMMERCE.”

HAVING enumerated with what wonderful celerity Egypt, by reason of its favoured position, can communicate with every other country of the globe, I may reasonably take this advantage likewise to the account of its commerce; for what advantages do not derive to commerce from brevity and expedition? But Egypt has other advantages as important as these; she has the same facility of intercourse internally, and can convey her produce and importations to every town and village in the country with equal promptitude and ease. The Nile provides for this; but Egypt has a more essential obligation to the Nile.

CHAP. III.

“ AS TO ITS PRODUCTIONS, AND COMMERCIAL RESOURCES.”

WERE it needful, I could enter into a detail of the various productions of Egypt; but sufficient for the present purpose may be to aver from observation of my own, that having supplied her natural wants, she can send annually a thousand ships abroad with her superfluous productions.

She is the magazine of all the trade of Yemen; the mart for all the coffee and rich gums of that proud territory: she is the magazine to all the interior parts of Africa, producing gold dust, ivory, senna, drugs: she is the resort of all the traders of the world: it seems a common centre of universal commerce: the coin of all the world is current here.

CHAP. IV.

“AS TO ITS GOVERNMENT.”

I AM puzzled to define its government: who has ever defined it? It is neither a dependent nor independent state; yet is nominally subject to the Ottoman Porte, and virtually independent. I must attempt the history of it.

Egypt was originally subject to the Caliphs; upon the declension of their power, the Mamaluks, their slaves, usurped upon their masters, and governed for themselves.

Sultan Selim, about two hundred years ago, conquered it from the Mamaluks, and gave them the government they at present enjoy.

It is a mixed government. It is composed of four and twenty Beys, of which number a Pasha, appointed by the Sultan, counts for two; his kaya, or deputy, one; and the remainder are made up from the body of Mamaluks.

The Pasha is merely the representative of the Sultan; the mere pageant of authority. His power extends to none of the executive functions of the state. The real active administration of public affairs is vested with the Beys. One among them is denominated Sheck Bellad, or chief of the country; and he appoints to all the other offices of the state. The Pasha has no more to do than confer the sanction of legal investiture upon such as are presented to him by the Beys. He exacts a settled annual tribute, as the sign of their fealty and subjection, and should remain other-

wife a passive member of the constitution.

So great was the Sultan's aversion from any thing like a pretension to power in his Pasha, that upon any account whatever, without even the obligation of assigning a reason, the Beys are constitutionally authorised to depose him, and as often as they shall think fit so to do.

What the policy was of this strange unequal distribution of power in the government of Egypt, and why Sultan Selim should construct it so differently from that of the other conquered provinces, is matter of curious speculation.

But not difficult to explain, if judging of causes from effects, we may legitimately assign that for the principle, which is in-

variably vindicated through a long succession of events.

Selim had to guard against too dangerous an aptitude in the natural and intrinsic resources of Egypt to declare for herself: he knew the defects of arbitrary government: the nature of delegated authority, even in Turkey, partakes of the supreme too much to be injudiciously trusted; and Egypt is an empire of itself. He, therefore, sufficiently fettered the ambition of his Patha.

But in doing this, did he not court the other extreme? did he not arm the restive spirit of the Mamaluks? Let us consider these Mamaluks.

The Mamaluks, a set of swineherds, vagabonds, any thing; kidnapped in the

mountains of Mingrelia, Circassia, Georgia, and brought young into Egypt; sold, circumcised, and trained to the career of glory; their road to honour, apostacy; their title to power, assassination and a contempt of death: no stability, no order, no character among them, but a constant thirst and jealousy of command.

Then I answer, a power so placed controuls itself. But to counteract, more effectually, the possible ambition of any more aspiring and resolute among the Mameluks, the Pasha has an extraordinary interest given to him in every new creation of Beys; and is, consequently, for ever using such means to promote that spirit of dissension and revolt among them, as is sure to obtain this end. Hence the perpetual commotions in the government of Egypt; hence the divisions amongst the Beys; hence the alternate prevalence of parties; hence

the continual fluctuation in the tide of power; hence the security and affection of the state.

Ever since the establishment of this incongruous government, these have been the invariable effects of it. The Pasha inciting disorders and conspiracies among the Beys; the Beys expelling the Pasha in return, and the government subsisting inviolate in the midst of it.

The revolt of Ali Bey, under favour of the Russian war (1770) may indeed be brought against me as an exception; but I am not alarmed for my principle in the contemplation of this event: I take it as an illustration of my text. That same spirit which kindled the revolt; which blew it into such a blaze; of itself extinguished it. No power was sent against the rebel; no external force was employed; it

was done by that constitutional self-destroying spirit, originally disseminated among them by the wisdom of Selim's policy: it was that ambition common to every Mameluk that quelled it! Mehemed Bey, his creature, his favourite, his general, growing too great for restraint, deserted his master; opposed him; slew him; and to make his peace with the Porte, sent offers of submission; restored the constitution to its bounds, and was allowed to hold the reins while he lived, as a reward for his repentance.

CHAP. V.

“ AS TO ITS MEANS OF CONQUEST.”

RELATIVELY to the countries about it, they should seem omnipotent.

When Ali Bey threw off the yoke, he marched to Mecca, and subdued it. He marched to Palestine, and subdued it. He marched to Syria, and subdued Damascus, Sydon, and Tripoly. He could say, with Cæsar, “ *veni, vidi, vici.*” Wherever he appeared, they submitted. The whole empire was in a consternation. Aleppo had appointed deputies to solicit his yoke.

But the crisis of his glory had passed! his own forces turned against him, and he perished.

What were these victorious armies com-

posed of ? Ten thousand Mamaluks on horseback ; two or three thousand Saratches, or foot soldiers ; and a rabble of twenty thousand attendants.

Egypt, therefore, convulsed, as we have seen, for two hundred years, by an hydra-headed government, had still resources left to send out powerful armies to conquest : not as the Goths went out, to seek subsistence ; for the Egyptian armies were supplied from Egypt ; but to add dominion to dominion.

Their conquests should argue for the martial spirit of the people, as the supplies do for the resources of the country : No such thing ! Ali Bey had made himself terrible by his severity at home ; and as he marched out, nobody was prepared to encounter him. He owed his conquests to the exhausted state of the

countries he assailed ; for victories he gained none ! How could he ? he was not opposed.

CHAP. VI.

“ AS TO ITS PRESENT STATE, AND, APTIBILITY OF DEFENCE.”

MEHEMED BEY, who had so enriched himself by the conquests he had made for his master, Ali Bey, as to acquire the surname of Father Gold (Aboudàhab) began to wish for an easier situation ; and to accomplish it, thought of purchasing his peace of the Porte by the sacrifice of his master and his conquests, and by restoring Egypt to its former nominal allegiance. He did it in fact, and was so much credited for his sincerity, as at once to gain the investiture of Sheck Bellad, and the dignity of Pasha of Egypt, confirmed in his own person : a circumstance never before known, and uniting in him a more dangerous power, because authorised, than ever Ali Bey had usurped. His reign was,

however, short; and ended in a phenomenon :—He died in his bed.

It happened in the year 1775, and I introduce this account of it, because it leads to some little history of the military achievements of the Mamaluks which have fallen under my immediate observation.

Mehemed Bey died in an expedition against Daher el Omer, an Arab Sheck; and, in defiance of the Porte, many years absolute master of Acri and Palestine. His army dispersed the instant of his death, and fled like defeated vagabonds to Cairo.

The government of Egypt was seized on by the locum tenens, Ibrahim Bey; but the other Beys who had accompanied the army, were determined to dispute his title to it.

They divided into factions, and every faction has prevailed in its turn: I have been witness to five revolutions in four years.

Some have been effected by a single treacherous blow: all were attempted by assassination; and such as failed sent the parties to the field. These are the only instances I know of their feats of arms. The contest is confined to the divided Mameluks, but these draw after them their usual rabble of attendants. The antagonists take positions for opportunities of advantage, and are never sudden in their resolutions. They take good time to digest their plans. The conflict has always summed up in a desertion from the weakest side to the strongest, and then the deserted party flies. The others pursue, but as all the ardour is foremost with the fugitives, the number of slain, where sometimes thirty

thousand men have been engaged, has never exceeded seven—seven unfortunate men !

What must the foldiers be who fight such battles ? What the people who submit to such a government ? What the country that can flourish under such oppression ? Soldiers without discipline, and bred in slavery ! A government that is the reward of the boldest assassins ! A people resigned to slavery from invincible habit. A country sending annually a thousand ships abroad with its superfluous productions. Accessible on all sides, yet capable of defence against the most powerful assailant.

Egypt is accessible on all sides, because of the ignorance and want of discipline in its present possessors. All the avenues to it are open and unguarded.

Alexandria has two ports. The old port, which is safe, and can contain as many ships as the greatest power can send against it; and the New Port, which is unsafe, and exceptionable on many accounts. The entrance to both is from the wide sea, offering no kind of shelter, or hardly anchoring ground until the ship is in the heart of the town. Castles properly disposed to guard the entrance to these ports might defy all the powers of the globe.

Aboukir is a small port, East-North-East of Alexandria, of nearly the same description in point of approach. The interval along the coast is rocky and dangerous. The Rossetta branch of the Nile is navigable to small vessels, but none of force sufficient to cover a landing can approach it. All along the coast of the Delta is shoal to the Damietta branch, which admits of vessels of greater burthen,

but not of a capacity to force a footing against any well-directed resistance ; and further along the coast to Joffa and Acri is worse. The boundary on the land side Eastward, is a sandy desert ; and following the line which separates this desert from the fertile land of Egypt, quite up to the meridian of Suez, has no habitable spot within an army's march of twelve days.

At Suez we are vulnerable to a fleet ; but Suez is separated from the inhabited land by a desert of three days' march ; and a fortification calculated to defend the town and watering-place for forty days, would defeat the best efforts of an enemy ; no fleet being able to contain store of water for an army, after so long a voyage, that would supply a longer term ; and none is to be found near enough to supply the indispensable need of it.

Pursuing the line of separation in a parallel with the Red Sea, running Southward quite up to the latitude of Cossir, there is no possible access by sea; and Cossir, guarded by a fort, would equally repel all attacks on that side. Not a single communication besides, from the Red Sea to the inhabited land of Egypt, all the way South to the cataracts; and above them are an inoffensive race of people. On the opposite side of the Nile, beyond its fertile margin, all the way down to the Mediterranean Sea, are the great deserts of Lybia, and Barea. This singular and invaluable situation is, from the defenceless condition it is in, exposed to invasion from the weakest of European adventurers: but a marshaled power in possession of it might be inexpugnable. The actual inhabitants would form to discipline, as the Indians, and be in a condition to contribute to its

defence. They are robust and pliant, insured to fatigue, and very indifferent as to their condition in life.

CHAP. VII.

“AS TO THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS SITUATION TO ENGLAND, SIMPLY IN SUBSERVIENCE TO HER POLITICAL AND COMMERCIAL CORRESPONDENCE WITH INDIA.”

THESE were my arguments in the year 1773, and I carried them into execution.

A communication with India by the Red Sea may be established, which in its consequences will have this operation: It will create a call for the manufactures of Bengal principally, which will contribute to the prosperity of that country. It will, in exchange, supply them with a large return of Specie, the sinew of our importance in India. It will deduct from that of the French, by taking away the foundation of their trade. It will afford a channel of expeditious correspondence, which is the

soul of government, between England and the East Indies; and in the event of a sudden war, may enable us to conquer our rivals, and add their possessions to our own.

That event did happen, and the establishment I formed with these views, was the vehicle of our salvation in India; was the vehicle of our preservation in the West Indies; was the instrument of gaining that only equivalent we had to offer in our negociation for peace; was a circumstance which had a considerable share in saving our national honour.

These should be earnest of its future importance; but more may be said. Very little indeed need now be added, to prove the communication by Egypt to be a necessary link in the chain of our connection with India. It will appear with more effect, in a view of the importance of this

situation to France. I foresee that the topic is replete with matter of arduous speculation.

CHAP. VIII.

“ AS TO THE IMPORTANCE OF EGYPT TO
FRANCE.”

BEFORE the fate of America was decided, I took into my head to argue thus—1780 ;—but the argument was not without extraneous provocation.

“ Should France be sensible of the advantage of adding Egypt to her dominions, and were tempted to try the conquest of it; *supposing her triumphant in the present contest upon the sea*; what power on earth could prevent her designs ?”

But the question being yet doubtful as to its issue; this might be said: “ Were France to make the best use of her present power, her plan would be to leave America to her fate; to preserve her present

naval consideration entire; and to secure the neutrality of England to this more plausible design. It will bear investigation.

For America independent, may grow to be a more dangerous enemy to France than England is: first, from the proximity of her power to the French islands; and next, from the irreconcilable principles of American policy, with the known maxims of French government.

Because France will secure, without fighting, what all her efforts have never obtained—to say, “as strong a fleet as England, and a colony more than adequate to all her islands, and all her prospects from American connections.”

Because the commercial interests of England and France, drawing thence to oppo-

site points, may remove the ancient bone of contention.

Because every consideration conspires in such a system to aggrandize the power; increase the wealth; and insure the tranquillity of France.

The navigation is short and safe.

The colony subject neither to hurricanes, sickness, nor earthquakes.

No rival in the way of her commercial operations.

No enemy to intercept her succours, in case of alarm.

No need of transporting subsistence to her forces when there.

Were all this to be obtained, would not France take it for a doubtful cause? would not England accede to it, to purchase her defection from America?

The idea of recovering America from an actual uncertain state of the war, would have weight with England; but in contemplation of her East India possessions, and the prospect of danger to these from the growing power of America, in any future contention, ought to dispose her for such an accommodation. France would have nothing to fear from the resentment of America, because it must be the interest of England to deprive her of her strength. The accession of Egypt to France might be disarmed of its danger to England, by an arrangement which should secure the navigation of the Red Sea exclusively to England; and nature has concurred to every other disqualification. The independency

of America, or even an unrefricted trade, which has already been offered to them, are fraught with mischiefs to the interests of England: I, rather than grant them, would vow perpetual war with France.

But this opportunity is gone; at the time I now write, America is independent. Let us revert to our text.

The importance of this situation to France is, I think, transcendently shewn in the reflections we have just read. England must now look with a jealous eye to the machinations of France.

CHAP. IX.

“AS TO THE CONQUEST OF EGYPT BY
FRANCE.”

THERE is a long preliminary to be settled before this can be attempted with any certainty of effect. The temptation is, however, paramount to all.

When I said, that the independency of America, or even an unrestricted trade allowed to them, was pregnant with mischiefs to England, I confess that I suspected from the least of them almost unavoidable perdition to our settlements in the East Indies. The effect of the former I considered to be nearer; but I looked for the same consequences, more remote in the prospect, even from the latter: I would rather have vowed perpetual war to France.

Some reasons will be expected from me, I suppose, for this inveterate pre-election.

If the latter may be vindicated by argument, the first, of course, will speak for itself: I shall only speak to the latter.

Then, I say, an unrestricted trade will admit the ships of America into all the ports in the East Indies; and this intercourse with our settlements will produce the effect.

What is the state of the English possessions in the East Indies?

A country almost equal in extent to all Europe, and richer in its natural resources.

An army of one hundred and twenty thousand men, well disciplined.

A revenue badly administered, capable of defraying such an army; of defraying the civil government; and still of remitting millions sterling annually to England.

At a distance mocking all coercion.

France and America nearer to them than England, and ever anxious to favour their defection.

With such truths to revolve in minds already complaining of the arbitrary exercise of authority, the Americans arrive among them free, exulting, broke loose from all restraints. Need any thing be added?

But I do not insist upon this, as a sole

and indispensable incentive: it has a portentous look, no doubt, and may come in as a cause, or be concomitant to the effect: I construct my motive to this conquest upon other grounds.

I construct it upon the degeneracy and degradation of the Turks; upon the weakness of the Egyptians; upon the common policy of empire and of states; and upon its general compatibility with the views and interests of every European maritime state encompassing the Mediterranean Sea.

These considerations united, (and who shall say they have no existence in fact?) The opposition of England, and of all who may be disposed to join her, will fail in their best efforts to prevent it.

Must I support my propositions by argument? Then I appeal to the state of the

Turkish empire; an empire dismembered by revolt; despoiled of revenue; having no resources; their military spirit debased; their fleet degraded; their power a phantom; their government decaying under its constitutional defects.

And is it still for me to prove that the nature of all power is to assert itself; to encroach where it can? Then appeal to the fate of Poland; appeal to America; appeal to the Crimea; appeal to Holland; appeal to the history of the world. I believe there is an essential principle in the doctrine of power: it is another atmosphere; it can know no void; it rushes in upon every recess; it is dominion's tide; its causes float upon the passions and distempers of men.

In this view, were the powers of Austria, and Russia to press in upon the yield-

ing provinces of the Turk ; France, unable to oppose them, would embrace the alternative and join in the spoil : Egypt would be the natural lot of France ; and Russia and Austria, elated and fated with the division of the rest, applying to the advantages contained in the completion of these events, conspire, concert, and mutually abet the general and separate interests of the whole.

I have before described the defenceless state of Egypt, as to its proper resources ; and now, the protection they derived from their nominal dependance on the Porte, is lost in the extinction of that power itself. Who, then, is to resist the powers which may assail her ?

If Venice is to recover a portion of her lost commerce and estates ; if Spain, and Genoa, and Malta, allured by the prospect

of gain to themselves, from the consequences of success in these schemes, should join their confederate force to the fleets of France; would England singly oppose them? Or who is to oppose them with any effect?

France, in possession of Egypt, would possess the master-key to all the trading nations of the earth. Enlightened, as the times are, in the general arts of navigation and commerce, she might make it the emporium of the world: she might make it the *awe* of the Eastern world, by the facility she would command of transporting her forces thither, by surprise, in any number, and at any time; and England would hold her possessions in India, at the mercy of France.——1785.

GEORGE BALDWIN.

И Л Т И

ДЛЯ ВСЕХ, КТО ИЩЕТ

ПОСРЕДСТВОМ КОТОРОГО

МОЖНО

ПОЛУЧИТЬ

ПОСРЕДСТВОМ

КАКИХ-ТО

ОСОБЫХ

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LETTER

TO THE

RIGHT HON. HENRY DUNDAS,

ONE OF

HIS MAJESTY'S PRINCIPAL SECRETARIES OF STATE,

&c. &c. &c.

WAR DEPARTMENT.

SIR,

I HAVE the honour to inform you, that in consequence of a letter I received yesterday, from his Excellency Admiral Lord Keith, dated Mahon, November 18th, telling me that he was going with Sir Ralph Abercromby on an expedition to a country where my knowledge and experience might be of essential service to the cause, and inviting me to join him at Malta, I am going this day to embark on his Majesty's frigate Greyhound, commanded by Captain Ogle, to depart immediately for that def-

tion, and shall be the happiest man in the world, if I can contribute one atom only to the attainment of the desired end.

And, Sir, you must permit me to tell you, that I had not waited to receive this invitation to determine me to go upon this service; for having heard that the expedition was expected to arrive at Malta on the way to Egypt, I had resolved to repair thither to volunteer my best services, thinking that they might be useful to the cause; and this Mr. Locke, our Consul here, can attest. I may be allowed to take some pride to myself for this anticipated, unasked proof of unabated zeal for the King's service, and in a certain title it will give me to your favour and approbation.

Now, with regard to our prospect, although I am sure that the expedition will

be crowned with success; yet the obstacles which the French will have raised to it, and which did not exist when they landed, will require some length of time to be overcome.

I cannot, Sir, in the short moment of time, at present allowed me to write, enter distinctly into the matter, nor give my ideas (crowding together as they do by the pressure of the occasion) so clearly as I could wish to do; but considering these obstacles to our approach on the shore, and the present bad season to overcome them in, I see no alternative so good as landing the army at Acrida, and marching them along the coast into Egypt; and this is supported by the following reflections: and first,—“because, although the season for debarkation along the coast is bad, it is the mildest season of the year for the troops to march in;—because this previous march-

ing towards Egypt, will be a kind of necessary preparation, and graduation of climate for the troops ;—because it will afford us an opportunity of reclaiming Gezar Betha to our purpose, and to good and effectual purpose in all respects ;—because it will bring our army in countenance and co-operation with the Vizir's army ;—because it will connect us with the Arabs, and open a road of communication with our friends, if any come from India by the Red Sea, and the Mamaluks in Upper Egypt ;—because it will necessarily force the enemy to extend their line of defence, and give us of course a much more various option of attack ;—because, by entering Egypt on the Damietta side, we may be supported by the co-operation, and receive the very essential assistance of the fleet.” These are the foremost ideas of my mind : when the Commanders of this expedition are pleased to call upon me for information of any kind, I shall be

more than willing, as far as I may be able, to give it. My satisfaction will be complete, if I can give it to any good effect.

But, Sir, feeling as I do the importance, the necessity rather of this expedition to the interests of England ; I rather join in the wishes of all Italy, and the exigence of the case, that it were for the present moment to give way to as important, to the *more* important, because more urgent measure of saving Italy, Naples I mean ! from the arms of the French.

For it appears to me, that Bonaparte seeing in his incursion into Syria, how near he had touched (for he only failed by his miscarriage at Acri) upon the total subversion of the Turkish empire, is still brooding upon that design ; and to my suspicions has attempted, by very seducing propo-

tions, to debauch both Russia and Austria into a confederacy for dividing between them, the whole territory and dominion of that country.

And the evasive conduct, or unaccountable conduct of both those powers, since the return of Bonaparte to Europe, not only suggests, but confirms those suspicions ; and the facility of the execution, were they actually agreed, adds force to my apprehensions.

But Austria may see circumstances of danger to herself, perhaps, in this partition, which may give her some hesitation in deciding : and from this the yea and nay, which succeed so frequently to each other in all the measures of the Austrian government. . The French press them, and they look round for support.

If they could see the English army in Italy, the Austrians could say to the French; you cannot execute your designs upon Turkey, for the English will keep you out of Albania by opposing your invasion of the kingdom of Naples; and with their countenance, you will not so easily intimidate us into your measures.

But if Austria doth not see herself supported by friends on either side, she must hesitate still;—she must obtain a fresh armistice;—she must at length join the French.

Whether alone, or confederate with Austria, the French take advantage of this armistice infallibly to invade the rest of Italy: to invade the kingdom of Naples especially; and so distribute their forces along the Puglia to embark and pass over into Macedonia, into Bosnia and Albania,

and from Otranto into the Morea. They will, upon landing, insurge the Greeks to a man; for they are already all insurged in their hearts to a man; and the Turkish empire will extinguish like a spark.

Therefore, Sir, this should be first prevented. Our army should come first to Italy; it would determine the Austrians to act with vigour. The French disappointed of this measure, you weaken their argument with Russia; you take the ground from under their feet. They would not be very easy in Egypt. I think that they would wish to evacuate Egypt upon any terms.

But persuaded as I am of the triumph of our forces in Italy, were they to come; (persuaded, I say, because the enthusiasm of the whole people to join us is so un-

equivocally pronounced, as they are given to expect it) I would not at all consent to the simple evacuation of Egypt: I would take it by force of arms.

Because the possession of Egypt, as it is become a question between England and France, of 'thine or mine,' will be a measure indispensable to the preservation of the British dominion in the East Indies; and, with regard to the circumstances of the Ottoman power, can only be effectually accomplished by the trial of our arms. We shall have time to do this. We should first disappoint this plan of union and confederacy to divide the Turkish empire; not because the Turkish empire can be long upheld, but to defeat a confederacy so dangerous to the interests of England; to oppose the progress of the French in Europe.

Should we leave them to their fougue, and go first to Egypt. We shall conquer Egypt, I believe ; but to what effect ?

In looking behind us, we may see them enthroned on the wreck of the Turkish empire. I expect it !

You will remember, Sir, how long ago I have spoken of the consumptive state of the Turkish empire. You will remember, Sir, my Speculations on the situation and resources of Egypt, wherein I predicted, from my knowledge of these things, the probable invasion of Egypt, and the infallible success of the invader, by whomsoever attempted.

And now, that we have so much more evidence of its increasing impotence, in the vain efforts the Porte hath repeatedly made to repress the insolence of an insignificant

rebel, at the very gates of Constantinople ; shall we suppose that Bonaparte will be blind to the opportunity which will suggest itself in such inviting terms to his ambition, (the moment we are engaged with our army in Egypt) to execute this his some time premeditated design.

I am convinced, Sir, that, although the estrangement of Russia from the confederacy against the French innovation may have had various causes, the policy which has been adopted in the room of it, in favour of an enemy so sincerely reprobated before, can only be an effect of overtures made by Bonaparte to dismember, and divide between them the Turkish empire.

And if Russia hath acceded to this proposal ; and that Austria should be forced to accede to it by our eloignement to Egypt,

I see nothing to oppose the inundation of Turkey in a moment of time.

I see another armistice immediately settled in Italy ;—I see the French forces consequently pouring down in torrents towards Ancona, and Brindisi, and Otranto ;—I see the armies of Russia ready to irrupt into Moldavia ;—I see the Austrians accumulating all along the Danube ;—I see the French providing embarkation for their troops and fleets to protect their descent along the Coasts of Dalmatia, Epirus, Corinth, and the Morea—I see the Greeks insurged ;—I see Constantinople invested ;—I see the Turk expire,

This is the scheme by which Bonaparte appears to have dissolved the combination against France ; and to have turned its engines quite round to the purposes of his own ever-designing rapacity and ambition.

If his judgment is equal to his ambition, I think that he will take no care about our expedition to Egypt, and occupy himself entirely about the execution of his new design. But as ambition, inordinate ambition especially, is of too turbulent a nature to leave the judgment in its characteristic clearness of seeing, and deliberate perspicacity in determining its options; and as I have great faith in my principles about right and wrong, (i. e.) That a right course leadeth to prosperity;—that a wrong course leadeth to confusion. I confide in this truth, and will continue to hope that we shall do well, and that Bonaparte will be disappointed.

I have received letters in charge from his Royal Highness the Duke d'Aosta, for Lord Keith and for General Abercromby, to explain the expediency of coming first to Italy; the exigency of the case; the wish

of the people : their enthusiasm, as they are taught to believe that the English are coming to defend them ; their dejection, as any thing appears to disturb their hopes : and his Royal Highness has charged me verbally to enforce his persuasives by opinions of my own. * * * *

* * * *

9th December, 1800.

Note.—I was interrupted here, by a summons to embark, and I could not finish my letter.

General M——, who was present at the moment of this interruption, read my letter, and regretted that it could not be sent, and so did Mr. Locke, but I could not in that state of hurry and confusion go on any further. It was written on the 9th day of December, 1800. In lieu of it,

however, I wrote a short letter to Mr. Dundas, just to inform him of my destination, and to recommend my family to his friendship in case of my death, meaning certainly not to shrink from any hazard of my companions in this perilous enterprize. But I am returned with tidings of victory to my country; with good omens of future success; and with redoubled confidence that the cause of virtue will for ever triumph.

I embarked on the Greyhound, and sailed the same day, and on the 19th, after a very pleasant passage in all respects, arrived at Malta. I delivered my letters, but the decree was gone forth: the signal was out for preparing to sail. On the 20th, a captured polacca from Alexandria was brought in, having Tallien on board, with Magallon, the ancient Consul and colleague of mine, for many, many years in Egypt. He was the man who, confounding all dis-

tinctions in the new republican doctrines, was the foremost to seize on, and confiscate the property of his old friend; although, as it has been reported to me, the matter was referred by Bonaparte to his absolute discretion. “La France,” he said, “est faite pour conquérir, et non pas pour faire des compliments.”

In this captive state, however, being informed that I was on board the Admiral's ship, he desired to see me; and the Admiral desiring also that I should see him, I went along side the prize.

“J'y viens, et vous y allez,” he said.

“Oui, s'il plait à Dieu, nous y irons.”

“Vous y trouverez de vos effets.”

“Quels effets?” said I.

“Vos livres.

“ Bon ! ” said I, “ mes livres ! et le reste ? ”

“ Ah ! pour le reste, ” said he, “ J’en suis fâché ! ”

“ Vous n’avez jamais manqué de rien, j’espère ? ” said he.

I answered him, not caring to reproach him in that situation, “ la Fortune ne m’a jamais affectée. Je croyois seulement qu’on respectoit, par une loi constitutionnelle, les effets d’un Diplomat ! ”

Tallien, (who was by his side not known to me) said, “ Il est vrai ; mais vous allez vous-même vous dedommager. ”

“ Et dans le cas que je ne me dedomme pas, ” said I, “ le Consul Bonaparte n’auroit point égard à la loi ? ”

“ Monsieur,” said he, “ dans ce cas là, je vais en France, je pourrois y conter pour quelque chose ; rappelez vous de moi, je suis Tallien ; vous avez entendu de moi ?”

“ And I said, “ Certainement, je vous connois de nom. Je n’oublierai pas au moins votre offre.”

“ Je suis homme d’honneur, Monsieur,” said he.

And so we parted:

I augured well of this simplicity of discourse ; not for my own affairs, because I shall never look to France for any indemnity of my loss, but for the idea so simply expressed, of my going to Egypt to repay myself for my losses.

To others, I am told, he talked in a different style. He said the French would give us a good reception; that they had no objection to our visit; that they would do us honour, and so on.

We sailed on the 21st, and my letter to my friend and kinsman, John Baldwin, relates our visit, and the reception we received.

GEORGE BALDWIN.

London,

Aug. 27, 1801.

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1

CONSIDERATIONS
FOR THE
ARMY,
ON AN
EXPEDITION TO EGYPT;

PROPOSED BY HIS EXCELLENCY
GENERAL ABERCROMBY,

AND WRITTEN ON BOARD
HIS MAJESTY'S SHIP FOUDROYANT,

On the Passage from MALTA to MAMORICE. December 1800.

CONSIDERATIONS
FOR
THE ARMY,
ON AN
EXPEDITION TO EGYPT, ETC.

AS TO THE CLIMATE.

IN January, February, and March, the weather is variable, but more good than bad. Over head is generally dry. The heat is supportable. Sometimes rain, but under foot sandy and dry. In rainy weather, the ground on the banks of the Nile and in the cultivated lands slippery, but not swampy, excepting in the rice-grounds.

April and May, the heats are often excessive. The desert or khumseen winds blow at times: they commonly last three

days. The intervals of these winds are very supportable; under foot dry. These khumseen winds, if so late in the season as the end of May, are sometimes deadly. The best repair is in the ground-floor, cooled by water.

June: the North-west winds set in, blowing strong, but not tempestuously. The Nile waters begin to increase.

July and August: the Nile increasing, and attaineth its greatest heights. The North-west winds as before. The air very much tempered and refreshed by these winds and increasing waters.

September: the waters are let in upon a great portion of the land. The air is still more refreshed by these expanded waters. At night, the breeze comes off the land.

October, November, and December, are pleasant months on all accounts. The climate is generally very healthy. Inflammations in the eyes are caught by sleeping (in a perspired state) in a current of air. Fluxes are got by sleeping uncovered, or too lightly covered in the night air. The night air is wonderfully thin, and searching to the bowels. The plague may be kept off by keeping the impested at a distance, and making them perform quarantine. Anointing the body with Olive Oil, will preserve any man from infection, and will, in most cases, cure the already infected.

AS TO THE DISEMBARKATION OF THE ARMY.
THE COAST CONSIDERED.

DURING the Winter months, and most commonly in January, February, and March, we experience some stormy weather; but seldom more than twice in a season, and some years not at all. The storms begin in the Southern quarter, and veer round to the South-west, when the wind blows very strong; but ships get off the coast, and go for shelter to Cyprus. The storm then veers round to the West and North-west, blows hard, and drives in a tremendous sea upon the coast. The ships in the Eastern port run great hazard; but in the old or western port, ride safe. These storms are commonly over in three days.

In the intervals of these storms, the weather is moderate and pleasant: and the winds come sometimes off the shore; but

the prevailing wind is North-east, blowing right along shore, not violent, and always smooth water.

The French army landed to the Westward of the old port, behind the point which forms the Westernmost boundary of the old port of Alexandria. There stands on this point a marabut, or sanctuary, and in its neighbourhood there is good fresh water, but in what quantity I know not: the French have raised a battery on this point. From this point runs a ridge of rocks under water, North-eastward, for more than a mile into the sea. Ships coming into port, when round this ridge, must come under the fire of this battery per force.

All great ships going out of the old port, usually come to an anchor short of this point, to wait for a good opportunity to go

out. The distance from the nearest castle of Alexandria I judge at three miles in a direct line; but the French master of a vessel we have taken, now only twelve days from Alexandria, calls this distance six miles.

Ships of a thousand tons burthen, laden with merchandise, navigate this port: so did all the Capitan Pasha's squadron, (excepting his own three-decker, which he did not chuse to hazard) sail in, and about, and out again of this port, in the year 1786, under my own eye and observation.

The road, leading from the point towards the city, is chiefly rocky and hard ground, but not bad to tread. In your approach toward the city, you come upon a neck of land, bordered on your right by the lake Mareotis, and on your left by the sea.

In passing along this neck of land, you pass over the catacombs, where a mine might be apprehended. The entrance to these catacombs is near the sea, distant from the city about a mile or more.

The landing place to the city is upon a sandy beach, easy, and always practicable.

The French Captain informs me that a wall has been raised by the French, leading from the old port round the westernmost hill of the ancient city, encompassing the whole of the modern city, quite to the tower called Cleopatra's Palace; but that this wall had no other purpose than to keep out the Turkish Cavalry. Very few cisterns can be contained within this enceinte.

The easternmost hill is situated about half way in the entrance of the narrow part of the ancient city, and commands almost

all the cisterns from which the town is indispensably supplied with water. Both hills are fortified by the French, and may annoy each other.

Without the walls of the ancient city, near to the easternmost hill, are high grounds which over-look the walls, and can annoy that hill. Within the walls, also, from the Rosetto gate to the hill, are high grounds, capable of annoying the hill. If this hill were mastered, it would command most of the cisterns. You might, by the possession of this hill, cut off the supply of water from the city, and force the enemy to a speedy composition.

Now, to come under the walls of the ancient city eastward, if the hope of landing to the westward is relinquished, we have nothing to do but go to Aboukir. Unless it may be preferred (by favour of

the North-east wind, which blows right into the new port) to go straight in and seize upon the place by a coup-de-main. This might be done, with little danger (as I apprehend) by night.

The boats might come into the port, and land to the left along the beach, upon a spacious plain, from which you diverge by two or three principal streets, in a western direction, into the heart of the city; or along the ruinous walls to the North-east, under Cleopatra's Needle, bringing you upon the lesser hills at the back (northward) of the village at the Rosetto gate: or rather by striking in a straight line South as you land, go about four hundred paces direct to this formidable hill and storm it. The importance of this post, would make me strive to carry it: but those who know what concerns the execution better than

me, may think it wiser to proceed to Aboukir.

At Aboukir, the landing once forced, and the fortress subdued, the great difficulty presenting to the army is the want of water, until possession is obtained of the hill of Alexandria: the distance is about fourteen miles. The road is hard, and the French Captain informs me, has been made carriageable. On each side of the road, going from Aboukir to Alexandria (that is to say on the right) are hills of ruins between the road and the sea; and on the left are sand-hills, but passable to the cavalry.

There is water at Aboukir, but brackish, and not abundant: the road leads to the Eastern (called the Rosetto) gate of the ancient city; but about a mile before you come to the gate, on your left, you see the

famous canal which carries the Nile water to Alexandria, with plantations of palm trees on each side of it: turning to your left, pursuing the course of the canal, you are brought to the foot of hills, on the summit of which stands the column of the world—Pompey's Column! from which I have said the principal hill might be annoyed. The walls of the ancient city lay between, but are no better than rotten paper.

Immediately within the Rosetto gate, on each side of the road, is a village; but rising gradually, to the right and left, to hills not much inferior to the principal hill. The hills on the left lead quickly to the principal hill, and offer great facilities for assailing this formidable post. The hills on the right present great inequalities, and in a view to besieging the principal hill,

afford good repair from the enemy's shot, and every circumstance of ground to favour your approaches. To the Northward of these inequalities, about one-third of a mile, is the wall of the city ; behind that, a ditch ; and beyond that, a slip of level ground, quite to the coast of the sea. All these hills are heaps of ruins accumulated from the ancient city. This is what occurs to me concerning Alexandria, attempted from Aboukir.

But if we are to look further than Aboukir for a place to make our descent, along the coast five or six miles, there is a passage into the Maadie lake. If this lake is navigable to our boats (which I judge it must be from seeing fishing boats in it) ; the army might go into this lake unmolested from Aboukir, and come to the back of it, nearer to Alexandria ; or might turn to the East, and go near to the banks of the

Nile; or do both, and by means of this lake, keep up a communication from the Nile to the neighbourhood of Alexandria.

Or if it may be deemed expedient to occupy the Bogas of Rosetto, the army might, whether from the lake or pursuing along the beach, come to the back of the castle of Rosetto, and what other batteries the French may have raised to oppose the entrance into the Rosetto branch of the river: There may be no need of discanting upon the importance of possessing the navigation into this branch of the Nile.

To attempt to force a landing (by forcing this passage into the Nile) on the banks of the Nile; would require good weather, good pilots, and many contingent considerations, which, at this season of the year, are not so much to be depended upon. In July, August, and September, this

might be advised, the weather being steady, and the water over the bar sufficient : the same of the Damietta branch ; but

If we are to go still further, to examine what the coast of Palestine offers eligible to our purpose, I would say that the Bay of Acri will receive our whole fleet ;—that the landing of the army may be effected quietly ;—that the country, at this season of the year, is not unhealthy ;—that the weather is very supportable ;—that the march of the army, unmolested by an enemy, might habituate the troops in some measure to the country, and to the ways and means of living in it ;—that going even by this little progradation towards Egypt, may be a sort of seasoning to the army ;—that horses may be had to mount the cavalry, and camels to transport the baggage ;—that by this way you may depend on the co-operation of the Grand Vizir's army ; you will open a communi-

cation with the Arabs, and may ensure a very active co-operation from the Mameluks: all these circumstances, of great weight in the election to be made, and to which I should be almost decisively inclined, were we not stopt at the threshold by a consideration superseding all others, to say—
“ the existence at this moment of the plague in the army of the Grand Vizir.”

Therefore, I presume, that this measure will be abandoned. The expedition appears to me to be otherwise undertaken under every omen of success. The people of Egypt, the Arabs, the Mameluks, are all most unequivocally determined in favour of the English nation; and seeing them once on shore, effectually to support them, will feel and manifest an enthusiasm which we may see it necessary, perhaps, to endeavour to restrain.

This is what occurs to me at this time. If information should be wanting upon any point within the compass of my experience or judgment, I am devoted to the cause.

G. BALDWIN.

*First day of the first
year of the nine-
teenth century.*

L E T T E R

TO THE

RIGHT HONOURABLE

SIR RALPH ABERCROMBY, K.B.

COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE BRITISH FORCES

DESTINED ON AN

EXPEDITION TO EGYPT,

SIR,

THE danger with which our army will be threatened if we come into any close co-operation with the Turkish army under command of the Grand Vizir, from the circumstance of the contagion being known to be doing havock in that army, has made it incumbent on me to address to your Excellency the enclosed copy of an Essay on that distemper, and the remedy resulting from it, both as a preservative and cure, warranted by the evidence of thousands in

a long and extensive experience of nine years.

But notwithstanding that this remedy will operate as a preservative and cure in the alarming necessity which would call for the application, I presume that the better way, considering the fatal consequences which may be dreaded from such an evil to our army, will be the *surest way*, and that will be *ab incipio* to guard against any, and every possible communication with the Turkish army.

I do not know what importance your Excellency may set upon the co-operation of the Grand Vizir's army in the scale of our purposed exertions ; but this I may be permitted to say, that the most effectual endeavours, and the most complete successes will be made vain by the introduction of the Plague among us ; and greater mis-

fortunes be entailed by it upon our country than our ardour to serve it will let us be aware of. I am sure the sense your Excellency must entertain of this danger, will apologize itself for my freedom in suggesting it.

If it may be necessary to soften the determination your Excellency may come to, to bar all communication between the two armies, by a qualification remonstrative of the necessity of it; it might be urged that in cases of contagion it is our custom so to do, and that the contagion ceasing in Egypt towards the end of June, our communication might then be resumed with proper effect.

And as a political measure, I think, Sir, that this appearance of non co-operation with the Vizir's army will be likeliest to gain to our side the hearty co-operation

of the Mamaluks, and of the peasantry of Egypt.

And I am so intimately persuaded of this temper of the Mamaluks, and of the peasantry and population of Egypt, as to dare aver with confidence, that they will only join us upon a presumption that we will act as a shield, and interpose between them and the power of the Ottomans. And, moreover, my persuasion is, that they will positively join the French to keep both of us out, if they can suspect that our design can ever be to abandon them to such a fate.

The ambition and hope of the Mamaluk is to reign ; to recover his sovereignty : The known, and now become necessary, policy of the Turk, is to annihilate the Mamaluk, and to despoil the country of its wealth.

With these reflections for the present,
which I hope you will ascribe to nothing
but zeal, I beg leave to subscribe with due
respect and deference,

Your Excellency's

Most devoted and

Most obedient Servant,

GEORGE BALDWIN.

On board his Majesty's ship

Foudroyant, Mamorice

Bay, Feb. 1, 1801.

E S S A Y

ON

THE PLAGUE.

E S S A Y
ON
THE PLAGUE.

I HAVE sought a remedy for the Plague in its history and character.

The origin of this disease is not known ! it may have had such an origin as the distemper produced in gaols, which is also contagious, to say : “ Long confinement ; deep anguish ; unwholesome Food ! ” But the origin of its introduction at particular times in particular places is always to be traced to a parent.

As for example, our present Plague in Egypt, 1791, was imported from Constantinople in a French ship called l’Aimable

Marie, Captain Estienne ; having several infected slaves on board. Some of them died at Alexandria, and the remainder were transported to Cairo. Ishmael Bey, Sheck Bellad, purchased them for Mamaluks. They infected his palace, and he fell himself a victim to it : From him the contagion spread all over Egypt ; and from Egypt to Rhodes and Stanchio, and Scio, and Smyrna, and over all the coasts of Syria.

The same thing is true with respect to every Plague which I have known of during an acquaintance and intercourse of one-and-thirty years with the greatest part of the Turkish dominions.

It is not in the air, as many, otherwise, great and learned men have supposed : Nor is it conveyed by swarms of insects generated in stagnate waters. No precaution

could defend us from it, in those cases. It is, on the contrary, a constant fact, that such as confine themselves to their houses, and avoid all contact with infected people ; or with things which have been in contact with the infection, are sure to escape it.

It is, therefore, only communicated by contact! I will not say absolute contact, because there may be great danger in ascertaining the fact: but it is proved, that infected people may be approached within a few yards without danger; but how near I cannot take upon me positively and precisely to say.

I have an opinion that it acts like the electric spark, flying from one object to another within the sphere of its influence: for the world will allow that there is great activity in the efforts of the Plague; but what the sphere of its power is, I cannot

determine. It is not very great. For this reason I do not say that it is only to be gained by absolute contact.

It is an evil, which hitherto having baffled all the skill of all the physical men in the world, made it, I thought, a vain pursuit in me to calculate its symptoms, and thence deduce its antidote, for nothing of this kind could have been left undone; and I confess that Symptoms confound me, they are so multiform, and that even then I am wanting of knowledge in the properties of drugs. I, therefore, resigned my researches upon this branch of the subject to the general defeat, and took it for granted that the road lay elsewhere.

I sought it in its natural extinctions! In Egypt, at the summer solstice. In Moscow, at the winter solstice. I found it limited by the North temperate Zone; stopt

by the heat of the Tropic, and at the Polar Circle by the cold. It is not known to the Southern Hemisphere. These are historical facts. Then its antidote is to be found in the extremes of heat and cold.

But how collect these extremes? how administer them? The hot bath? the cold bath? spirit of nitre internally? spirits of wine? I am no adept in these things. It seemed to me something to have settled a principle; and I took time to reflect.

Again. Let us consider the character of the Plague. What is the Plague?

A violent effervescence in the humours of the body; or in the blood; or in the nervous fluids; or in all! I am not tenacious for the precise term. The world will know that I am no doctor: but an effervescence which acting with more violence

than the constitution can bear, proves suddenly fatal. In stronger constitutions, or in weaker constitutions, if they will have it so, but in such constitutions as resist the effervescence, it resolves into tumors strongly inflamed, and offers a better chance of recovery.

Then, what causes effervescences ?

All acids, mixed with another sort of bodies called alkalis, will make a violent effervescence ! This, the Dictionary says, is the great general criterion of effervescences ! Then I conclude the cause of the disorder called the Plague must be an acid ! A malignant acid, if you please, or a benignant acid ; for I fancy that the quantity, or force of the acid, without any particular property even, might be equally deadly ; it depending upon the violence of its action. As in electrical operations, you will

find a spark, or a stream of fluid, benignant; and a sufficient shock of the same benignant fluid, destructive. The danger may be in the quantity! But let it be malignant in its essence, that is not the question: The question is—Is it an acid?

The effect of acids, is inflammation!
The Plague has this character!

Then, have acids, or the flame they produce, any observable predilection for one body more than for another? The electric fluid will quit one body to fly to another! Is it from a natural endeavour in fluids to establish an equilibrium in all things in affinity with them, that they will leave a body already saturated, to fly to another; or is it a predilection for one body more than for another?

It may be either: If the cause of the disease is pleased to leave the suffering body

to fly to another, from whatever impulsion it is, the evil is cured: Remove the cause, and you remove the effect.

But this is proper to the electric fluid: Is the electric fluid an acid?

If the character of acids is to inflame, the electric fluid will inflame! Try it with gunpowder, and see how it will explode! It, therefore, has the character of acids. Then acids, by the same rule, should have the character of the electric fluid: that is, to fly from one body to another: but the Reader will tell me, there are volatile acids: Why all this labour to prove it?

Then what are the predilections of acids?

If we consider acids in their effects on other bodies, they produce inflammation! And what are the predilections of flame? Why, generally speaking, to all oleaginous substances!

But flame will communicate, and expand itself, without abandoning its original prey. To prove that flame delights in oil, and will make efforts to get at it, is proving nothing to our intent. The cause remains where it was. We must get rid of the cause.

But in Flame that will communicate, there must exist its active principle, an acid. And if Flame is so fond of oils, its necessary cause, its companion, its parent can have no aversion from them !

This disquisition led me to make an experiment ; and in a glass I put some pure olive oil, and over it, on the glass, at a distance of half an inch at least, I put a lemon perfect, and almost mature. And in a few hours I had the satisfaction to see the acid of the lemon trickling down the glass, and mixing with the oil ; and in

about eight days the lemon had almost exhausted itself of every drop of its juice. I have always succeeded in this experiment, but with great diversity as to the time, from diversity of season, and quality of the fruit.

I had now an evidence of the predilection of the acid for an oil; and so strong a predilection, that it would quit its natural body to intermix itself with this stranger. These things may be common to professors in Chymia: So much the better; they will be the readier to approve me. But I have found them only now in the way to my purpose.

What remained to be done now, but to try the experiment on the Plague itself. An opportunity soon offered.

My opposite neighbour being at his

window, looked afflicted, I asked him what ailed him ? He told me that a young man, his relation, in a part of the same building he inhabited, was struck with the Plague. “ Anoint him with oil,” said I, “ and he will do well.” He had no opinion of the oil, and did nothing. The next day I questioned him, “ Well, how is your relation ? Have you anointed him ?”—“ No : he is better !” It was false : the man was worse. The third day in the evening I saw him again ; he was crying :—“ What is the matter with you ; is your relation dead ?”—“ No ; but he is very ill : he is dying !”—“ Anoint him with oil,” I said to him again : what do you risk ?—“ Oil is heating,” he replied.—“ Heating or cooling,” I said, “ would you have the man die ? try it.” And he left me, and went and saw that his relation was anointed : And the next day the man was free from pain ; with a good appetite, and a large

tumor in his groin, but perfectly easy. I ordered him to humect frequently the tumor with oil; and in eight days it came to supuration, and the man is now walking in the streets. This being promulgated among the neighbours, another infected person tried it, and was cured; and then another, and another, to the number of seven, whose names I possess, and whose blessings I enjoy.

Here then are evidences for my principle, which is, “ That the pestilential
“ humour which causeth the disease called
“ the Plague is an acid, and that it will
“ quit the human body to fly to the oil
“ which it prefers.”

Or if that preference, or predilection is not the principle of its action, (i. e. *le mot à la chose*) let it be that the acid having naturally a propension to intermix itself

with all bodies in contact with it, or within the reach of its activity, endeavouring always at an equilibrium, passeth, like the electric spark, from the human body into the oil; and of course causeth the body of that exceeding, which, from the effervescence it occasioned, was the cause of the pain.

But the evidence of seven is too small, in a matter of such consequence to the World, to obtain implicit belief. But any evidence at all, in a matter of such consequence to the world, ought to make us anxious not to lose it; therefore I say let more try it. Seven, it may be presumed, might have recovered without help. Have not many sevens recovered? Yes: I give it that more may be tried. Let my argument stand for nothing: But in truth, the only seven that did try it recovered: Let more try it. If the principle is good, it will

prove its virtue ; and if not, what risk is there in the operation, to a man infected with the Plague ?

There is, however, a strange perverseness in the human character. Many, whose friends were in the agonies of death, have been recommended to try it ; and they have answered, “ What can oil do ? ” And their friends have died ! Others, “ so many great Doctors have pronounced the evil beyond their skill, and is it now to be cured by oil ? ” And they too have devoted their friends to the public conceit.

But this is not the only instance of mortal diseases being cured by oil : Should I say, “ Diseases that would have been mortal without it ? ”

I have tried it on five rats stung one by one by a Scorpion. The first swelled to a

great size, and appeared to be near dead. I poured some pure oil upon him, and he recovered, and in a few minutes ran away.

But he might have recovered without the oil, as people say of my seven persons recovered from the Plague.

I put a second to the scorpion, and the rat was stung; and I left him to himself, and he died very soon. Then I presumed that the former had been cured by the oil.

I tried another, and cured him; and another, and he died. And another, and he was cured.

There was that virtue, therefore, in the Oil, or that predilection in the malignant humour which the sting infused for the oil, as to draw it from the body and avert the poison.

If the Plague is absolutely communicated by contact, or by a spark emitted from the body at any distance, why may not this contagion be assimilated to the puncture of a scorpion, or to the stinging of a nettle ; since acids are supposed to be little pointed bodies, fitted to enter the particles they assail ? There must be something very resembling in the characters of these evils : The poison of the scorpion, and the malignity of the Plague having such an astonishing activity in contaminating the whole mass of the blood, and are almost equally deadly in their effects. Then should it surprise that the same remedy should be efficacious in both.

I have applied oil to my foot in fits of the Gout, and have appeased the pain, and abated the inflammation almost instantly, without suffering a return. It is now six years since I have used it in fits of the Gout

with never-failing success. I have many witnesses to this truth, and do consider it as an infallible cure for the gout, as soon as it has resolved itself into an inflammation externally.

I knew of this so long ago, but certainly never thought of it when my mind began to be occupied with this search after a remedy for the Plague. When I adopted it originally in the Gout, I did it merely to seek a momentary relief from pain, having conceived that the sensory, being stretched by the swelling beyond its natural bearing was the reason of its suffering pain, and that it might be mitigated by relaxing the skin with oil.

Upon the first applications, and upon more recent occasions, when the inflammation has been very violent, I have observed the oil to froth, and even to hiss as cyder

or champaign will do when opened, and intermixing with the air : but it only struck me then as something extraordinary, and my inquiry went no deeper.

I understand it better now, and am persuaded that this frothing and hissing were the effects of the acid leaving the inflamed part, to coalesce with the oil, and producing thereon, by its action, this evident fermentation. There being, as Newton has said, “an acid in every fermentation.” And as the world will conclude, consequently, in almost the same words with me, “No fermentation without an acid.”

I have said enough ; being, as I believe, to the purpose.

My Recipe therefore is :

“ As soon as the first symptoms of the

Plague appear, to anoint the whole body with pure olive oil : for though the doctrine of this remedy seems to apply more especially to the stage of the disorder in which the tumors appear, yet the crisis of the greater danger laying between the attack and its attainment to this stage, it may be fatal to wait for the appearance of tumors. And besides, its efficacy is likely to be more certain in this case than the other.

When the Tumors appear, there needeth little more attention than to humect them frequently with oil.

And, I believe, that people having anointed their bodies with oil, will find it to be a preservative against the infection, and may attend their friends without apprehension of danger."

GEORGE BALDWIN.

Alexandria, 1791.

Now that I present this to your Excellency, volumes have been published of the efficacy of oil, in pestilential cases especially, and in many cases of diseases bearing any analogy to them, 1801. The candour of the medical faculty in attesting to the virtues of olive oil, and in recommending it to trial, even by publications in England, demand my sincerest acknowledgements and professions of gratitude.

A
NARRATIVE
OF THE
BRITISH CAMPAIGN IN EGYPT,
IN THE SPRING OF 1801,
IN A LETTER TO JOHN BALDWIN, ESQ.

L E T T E R

TO

JOHN BALDWIN, ESQ.

MY DEAR COUSIN,

WHAT changes and what miracles are brought to pass by a lapse of fifteen years of time ! I have enquired of your whole course, and hear that you too have had your vicissitudes of bitter and sweet. I left you a boy, and now find you with a military rank and fame to be spoken of with pride by your friends, and with honour to yourself. I have received great satisfaction in these accounts, for you may remember that I was a very frequent visitor in your family, and was at home among you familiar, as nothing but a very sincere affection could make me. Now you are sending me in-

vitations to come and see you at Winchester, telling me, by way of inducement, that you have a room and comfort to offer to me. I thank you for these proofs of unequivocal regard for me; but coming, as I do, from the rude and arduous scene of war, where stones are softened, by our sense of glory, into pillows of down, believe me, my dear friend, the room and comfort I should look for in coming to you would be no where but in your heart, and in my own desire to meet you: and I would come immediately, but I am become so important to the world by the information I bring from Egypt, that I cannot command an hour of time. The eagerness of the Publick to know (and the tribute of justice due to the brave Army of Egypt, to let the publick know) what British valour can accomplish, engages me all the day long: I am overwhelmed by the caresses of the publick for telling the tale. You

have entreated your father also to let you partake of this tale; and consulting nothing but my anxiety to oblige you, forgetting that you are of military distinction, I hastily promised to tell it to you myself, and he as hastily bound me to my undertaking :--

Therefore, Sir, you are to know, that the expedition to Egypt being resolved and ordered by Government, and the whole force assembled at Minorca, the Commanders in Chief, recollecting that such a man as G. B. had been known to have resided many years in Egypt, and might be presumed, of course, to possess much local and otherwise useful information about that country; and hearing that he was somewhere in Italy, took the determination to send a cutter to find him out; and being found at Naples, letters were presented to me from Lord Keith and General Aber-

cromby, requesting me to accompany the expedition, as deeming the knowledge and experience (which they were so good as to say they well knew I possessed of that country) essential to its good success. This was an honour that could admit of no excuse.

I had retired from the world, indeed, fatigued with long service and unavailing success respecting my own fortunes; and having no other wish (resigned as I was to an obstinate fate) than for tranquillity and peace.

It was a prospect, however, very far from tranquillity and peace that now opened upon me: but I was called upon by my country; and what Englishman could be deaf to such a call? It was too proud a distinction for any man to be deaf to; and I heard her voice and obeyed it. I am now glad that I obeyed it; for I have been

rewarded for my pains. I have seen, Sir, such action, such honour, such enterprise, such heroism, as are treasures to my mind ! such eternal, inexhaustible treasures of delight to my soul, as make all other treasures cheap to me ! Oh, that I could do justice to the tale !—I shall attempt it.

I had the happiness to embark with Captain Ogle, of his Majesty's frigate, Greyhound ; an officer highly distinguishable for his activity in his publick, and his generosity and politeness in his private station ; and in nine days, to say on the 18th of December, we joined the fleet and army at Malta.

Lord Keith would have me remain with his Lordship on board the Foudroyant, and I could not, of course, say, no. But General Abercromby would also have had me with him ; and I told him that my idea was

that my proper station would be to be with the army, but that Lord Keith had fixed me with his Lordship, and that I should be at the disposal of either, whenever they might have occasion for my services.

I remained with Lord Keith, on board the *Foudroyant*; and on the 19th of December, we sailed for Mamorice. We took a French vessel on our passage, bound from Alexandria to Marseilles, having some officers, passengers, on board. We got some information from her, concerning their force at Alexandria; and in nine days, to say on the 28th of December, we anchored at Mamorice. This is part of the ancient kingdom of Caria, famous for Artimisia, their queen; who raised that stupendous monument to Mausolo, her deceased Lord, from which all future sepulchral edifices took the name of Mausoleums. It is on the coast now called Caramania.

I was employed on the passage, noting (by General Abercromby's desire) whatever might occur to me relative to the object of the expedition; and upon our arrival at Mamorice, I presented them to him for his use and approbation. These will be found in the preceding pages.

Why we should assemble at Mamorice, was said to be to concert measures with the Ottoman Porte; to purchase horses to mount our cavalry; to collect ships to transport them; to procure Turkish gunboats to cover our landing; and vessels of lighter burthen to enter the lakes.

It took up to the 23d of February to effectuate these purposes. Mean while the sick were put on shore, and various encampments formed. Alternately, the whole army was on shore, paraded and refreshed. I saw them frequently, and sufficiently ob-

served them to augur well of their undertaking; and to conclude decisively in my own heart, that they would infallibly conquer.

When many of the officers have said to me—Baldwin, what do you think of it? The French will beat us! (meaning ironically): and I have said—No! The French beat these men?—No! You will conquer, if you *will* conquer. And they have said—then we *will* conquer, please God.

Possunt quia posse videntur.—VIRGIL.

For they can conquer who believe they can.

DRYDEN.

It is rather a melancholy reflection, however, that whilst we were devoting our time to the purposes mentioned, at Mamorice, the French were getting reinforcements of men and ammunition into Alex-

andria ; and otherwise encreasing the difficulty of our enterprize beyond the measures we could possibly acquire to overcome them.

But the day came at length for our departure from Mamorice, and the army sailed, impatient and glad, and full of spirits, to bring the question to an issue.

It was on the 23d day of February that we left Mamorice, with a strong Northerly gale, and fair. The whole fleet and convoy got safe out, and a very formidable assemblage we displayed. On the passage, however, our gale increased too much for our convoy of Greeks and Turks to persevere in, and they deserted us to a man ! So that upon our arrival at Aboukir, on the 2d of March, we were the same insufficient force, (if such a word can apply to such

an army) with which we departed, nine weeks before, from the Island of Malta.

Nothing, however, could dismay us. Let us land! was the universal cry. Let us finish it! To death or victory!

But on the day we arrived, although very fine, we could not be prepared to land; and on the next day, there came on another severe gale of wind, and made it impossible for us to think of attempting to do any thing until the seventh of March. In this interval of time, the French had opportunity to collect all the scattered divisions from the country, to strengthen their opposition to our landing; and we had the mortification to see them pass uninterrupted, every day along the beach towards Aboukir. But, at length, the wind abating, the General was enabled to go in a boat


to reconnoitre the shore, and to determine upon the scite fittest for landing. Sir Sidney Smith took the same opportunity to reconnoitre the lakes, and in three armed launches assailed a battery, took a block-house defended by fifty men on shore, boarded a guard boat at the entrance of the Aboukir lake, and after ascertaining certain points of service, returned with a Chief-de-Brigade captive, an afs, and a Fellah, its driver, to the unspeakable amusement of the whole fleet. Trivial as this event appears, it had enough in it to engage the spirit and excite the emulation of the whole army: every man wished to have been of the party: it gave a glee to our preparation for the next day.

The orders were given. The men were to be in the boats by two o'clock in the morning of the eighth; and upon the signal of a rocket fired into the air from the

Admiral's ship, the whole were to be put off towards the shore.

The rendezvous was appointed to be within the armed vessels stationed to cover the landing; and here the boats were to form, and take their order for proceeding to the shore.

The position of this rendezvous relatively to the coast, or scite appointed for the general disembarkation, may be described to be within the arch of a circle, whose base, on a line (of about three miles in length) drawn from one extremity to the other, would be about a mile from the shore; as for example:



a Aboukir Castle.

--- Batteries erected on the Sand-hills.

Within the line representing the base, were stationed the brigs of war and bomb-vessels destined to cover the landing. The Mondovi, commanded by Captain Stewart, was the centre ship of these; and here did I ask leave to be, to look at this eventful scene.

The rocket was fired, and the boats put off from the ships. I soon after got into my boat, and on my way came up with and passed the whole division of the army in about one hundred and fifty boats, and numbering nearly six thousand men.

You will have anticipated my reflections upon this scene. The silence of the night, and the solemnity of the business, passing along a space of six miles towards the shore, and amid this forest of ships, will naturally dispose one to many of those serious reflections, on the wonderful cast

and composition of men ; which, particularly at an hour so full of doom to thousands of us, will irresistibly intrude upon, and possess the mind.

You see me in a boat, enveloped by the sable mantle of the night, shrugged up to keep the cold from me ; my eyes turned up to the rich bespangled heaven of Egypt, seeing the wonderful hand of the Creator in every orb ; his omnipotence present to my mind : nothing heard in this solemnity, but the dismal murmur of oars, thousands of oars dipping in the sea, pulling eager and hasty to destruction ! And that I should be among them, amid this tumult of war ! reluctant to war, and rushing among the foremost into the horrors of it ! unaccountable destiny of man !

Ah ! but ambition must have bounds ! If ambition were to have no bounds, am-

bition would overawe the world ! Then who shall check ambition but the sons of freedom ? But who shall be worthy of freedom, but the virtuous ? But who shall spurn at the impertinence of Gallic pride, but Englishmen ? Then come on !—To work !

At about day-light, the whole division were arrived at the rendezvous ; and here they were employed arranging their military requisites until eight. It appeared, to our impatience, long. The French position, as to extent and appearance, I have delineated ; but fortified as it was, and defended by four thousand men, it might have resisted the world. I wish that I had talent to describe it to you ; for having seen the display of its effects upon the landing, from so near and central a situation, I ought to be able to impress you with a proper idea of its force. The Commander in Chief saw it ; but he viewed it with as much

calm as the opposition seemed to be stern and difficult to surmount : and there, where there seemed to be most strength, there did he determine to make his attack. I have been told, that it is the characteristick feature of his military life always so to do : and he did it—and he did well !

The hour for moving forward at length come ; the whole division was immediately in motion : the right wing under the fire of the castle of Aboukir ; the centre, under a sand-hill near sixty yards high, in the front and centre of the French position ; and the left wing on the right of the French, leading from the principal sand-hill to a low point, terminating at the entrance of the Aboukir lake. The spaces, from the extremities of the French position to the commanding hill in the centre, were interspersed with inferior sand-hills ; and in the intervals between these sand-hills were

stationed infantry and artillery innumerable, to annoy us. All this scheme of fortification appeared to refer its bearings to the great sand-hill in the centre, which, besides the cannon which were mounted on it to defend it, was, on account of the natural difficulty in ascending a yielding soil, deemed inaccessible.

Under this amphitheatre of hills and hillocks, forming gradations which may be compared to the seats in those amazing structures, and on which cannon at frequent distances all around were placed, as well as men to annoy us, did our brave army advance. Not a Frenchman was to be seen ; not in any array, nor on the beach ; but by stealth from their concealments. Our flat boats, with about fifty men in each, were preceded by armed launches, to check the fire of the enemy ; but they suffered our boats unmolested to advance, until the

whole division was within the arch of the circle already described ; then opened such an hail-storm of shot and shells of all dimensions, from within the whole circumference of this arch, from front and flanks ; such an hail storm, I say, (for whoever saw the effects of a most dreadful hail-storm upon the water, can alone conceive an idea of it) of shot and shells upon our boats, as nothing but the immediate hand of Providence could save from total submer-sion.

Let a man figure to himself the effect of a single shell striking the water near a boat, and the columns of water it dashes into the air before it, and then represent to himself the millions of these shot and shells, falling all around and among our army of boats, in quantity like hail ; then be assured that only one of this ocean of boats was materially hurt by the percussion of a

shell; and that none were submersed by the inundation of water upon them; and then let him say, if any thing but the immediate hand of Providence could have saved them.

And let him consider, that under this storm, which is only considered as to its real effects; under this incessant storm of shot and shells, and grape and missile of every denomination, filling the air with cloud, and sulphur, and fire, and thunder, and smoke, and all the horrors of damnation fulminating about them, did our brave army advance: yes! advance! But how advance? Cooped up in boats like sheep; their hands across upon their breasts; inactive, not insensible of the dreadful lot to which every man was helplessly exposed; still undaunted, undauntedly advance; and intrepid and impatient, gain at length the shore.

There was, however, a moment in this proceeding like a pause, a very awful moment; it was the moment which cost Major Ogle his life. I saw it from the poop of the *Mondovi*; and from the painful feeling it gave me, I felt myself shrinking from the horror of the scene: It was that point when

————Gone so deep in gore,
As dangerous to retreat as wade quite o'er.

I could not conceive the reason of this pause. I was trembling at the precipice which it presented to our affairs; when observing the beach, I fancied that I saw some of our men on shore: I was seized with a convulsion of joy; I shouted—they are on shore! huzza, my boys, they are on shore! And all our ship's company huzzaed; and so the next; and so the boats: it had the effect of wildfire; it caught like

an electric shock; the whole army shouted—
huzza! huzza! huzza! huzza! and on
shore they went.

They formed, and up this inaccessible hill, General Moore at their head. The French, on the top of the hill, were staggered with this wonderful audacity: I saw them hesitate and look, and turn aside; then stop and look again; not firing, as they might have done, with all the steadiness and advantage of their situation; but having no feeling, but a sense of their danger, they run. Our brave soldiers gained the summit, took some field-pieces from the enemy, and pursued them down the back of the hill to complete dispersion.

If you will bear this picture in your mind; that is to say, our troops in possession of this principal hill in the centre (from being at the bottom of the arch) in

the rear of the enemy's whole position, you will catch immediately the decisive effects of it ; and give to the Commander in Chief a merit in his plan of attack, which to men not acquainted with this preconception of the result, must appear the most daring, the most dangerous, the most desperate plan that ever was attempted and executed in the history of mankind.

For the centre hill carried, all the support of the enemy's flanks, referring to the centre, was cut off (See Plan, page 161) ; and instead, they had the English playing upon them in their rear.

It happened that in landing, our boats took a direction which brought them all on the front, and to the right of the French position. I attributed it to the dreadful fire of the castle flanking our right, which

would necessarily give them a tendency to the left.

On landing, the enemy poured down in torrents to the beach; they even rushed into the sea, and killed our men in the boats; but our brave fellows were not to be overcome. They formed steadily as they kept jumping on shore, and fought under this disadvantage like lions. They were charged by a body of cavalry; they broke this charge, and receiving continual succours from the boats, they forced the enemy to give ground.

It was at this moment of time that our right had gained the hill; for although there must be some distance in the description, there was very little in the time of the actions. The French troops perceived it; and sensible of the check they were

under by this event, were forced immediately to think of a retreat.

Not more than two thousand of our men were on shore, when they forced the enemy to give ground : but every step was fought ; was gained. And, at length, a victory (which will give a character to our army for constancy, resolution, ardour, intrepidity, and valour, never to be obliterated) crowned their brow with honour.

If every circumstance could be drawn of this great day ; if I could bring into the scene the various efforts of a generous people : the seamen ; the spirit of our young officers, some of them only boys in age ; the game they made of the danger ; their enterprize in going up to the cannon's mouth ; their effectual, their essential, their distinguished co-operation, I could move you, perhaps, as I myself am moved, to

weep, but whether I shall say for joy, or distress, or admiration, or pity, or what? or gratitude to such men; or to Heaven for giving them victory? or what? I cannot say: I feel it, and am overwhelmed. I cannot describe it; for not half the eventful tale is here.

The *amor patriæ*; the devotion for our country; our national pride; our enthusiasm for fame; the common cause of mankind in this unnatural war, are all motives worthy of sacrifice! and we have seen with what pride our countrymen will go to death so animated: but when the soul is satisfied; is left to contemplate, at leisure, the effects of these glorious conflicts upon the desolate field; the same magnanimity of sentiment converging from the public to the personal regard (for without personal feeling, no public virtue can inhere) will leave a void, into which sorrow will usurp, generous friendly

sorrow, and tinge the spirits with grief. This is a tribute due to exalted worth ; a tribute which worth, if a man hath any in him, will indispensably pay to worth : not because, in our judgment, it ought to be so ; but because the eternal law of nature *will have it so*. It dignifies mankind : it is well deserved ; well paid, to the victims of this well-fought field. I can hardly quit the theme.

The French retreated towards Alexandria, and we took up their ground ; our advanced post about four miles from Aboukir. We surrounded the castle, and sent an officer to summon it ; but the French Commandant would not even receive our summons : he fired a shot over the officer's head, to make him retreat. It was of no consequence to our ulterior designs : we prepared to besiege it, and occupied our-

felves with landing provifion and ammunition, to enable our army to proceed.

By night, the whole army was on fhore. I returned on board the Foudroyant to make up my wallet, to take my leave of the Admiral, and to beg to be put on fhore under command of our glorious General, Sir Ralph Abercromby.

It is to be remarked, that if we had not availed of that day to land; the ftorm arofe in the night, and would have prevented us for many days more. It was with infinite difficulty that I could be put on board a cutter to be carried to the fhore; and, at length, in landing I was completely fwamped. The fortune of war, faid I, and walked away to head-quarters. This was on the 9th.

I found the whole army difperfed among

the sand-hills ; many occupied in making huts of the branches of the palm ; others digging for water, which, contrary to expectation, was found in plenty, and good. And in short, the busy scene of warfare I joined, and was received by the Commander in Chief with his usual affability and kindness. He said to me—Baldwin, you will live with us a soldier's life ; but we shall fare all alike. I said—General, I am acquainted with this kind of life ; I like it. Then he said—I am glad of it ; you are welcome : and I was of his family, and always near him to the last.

Every effort was made, notwithstanding the gale, to land the warlike-stores, provisions, &c. &c. &c. ; and on the 12th, in the morning, we were enabled to move forward, and in the evening we came in presence of the enemy. They had taken a very strong position on eminences, and

among sand-hills, and plantations of palm-trees, which they had fortified with innumerable artillery, about four miles from the walls of the ancient city of Alexandria, Eastward. The sea on their left, and on their right the lake; forming a front of about two miles and a half.

They had been reinforced by three thousand men from Cairo, and where in all about seven thousand fighting men. They had a body of four hundred cavalry, and had flying artillery, which our army might be said to be totally deprived of. Some of our dragoons, pitifully mounted upon Turkish horses, doing piquet duty, amused themselves skirmishing with the French piquets, in the front of both armies until night.

We were in numbers about fourteen thousand men, but hardly any artillery,

compared with the strength of the enemy; and our cavalry too badly mounted to do any service.

The General determed to attack them in the morning following. The orders were given, and by day-light our whole army was in motion. I saw it from a signal-tower, close in the rear.

As our army advanced, the French had scattered their riflemen along our front, to pick off our officers, and they did incredible execution; but the army still advanced, and coming up to their posts, there opened such a tremendous fire from innumerable batteries, all along their front, as would seem impossible to be assailed. It appeared to me nothing more nor less than going to unavoidable slaughter. But with the same countenance, the same unshakeable

firmness, they advanced to the cannon's mouth, and conquered every thing.

Sir Ralph was once in danger of being enveloped by the French cavalry; but was saved by the singular intrepidity of the ninetieth regiment, which intervened, and were ready to receive the charge of the cavalry upon their bayonets. The French rode up impetuously to the points of our bayonets; and I was expecting to see the most dreadful conflict ensue; but their hearts failed them at the crisis, and round to the left they went off as rapidly as they came on: but our brave soldiers, in their turn, assailed, and brought eighty of them, men and horses to the ground.

We drove them from position to position, till they were close under the walls of Alexandria. They were, however, very regular in their retreating; and kept us en-

gaged the whole length of the day. They were making their last stand upon a hill, close to the walls of Alexandria: the General had ordered a detachment of the army to turn this hill, and come upon it in the rear of the enemy, whilst the main body of the army should ascend it in front. The detachment was considerably advanced on this service, and was engaged with the enemy near a bridge over the canal, whilst the ardour of the main body had carried them to the foot of the hill, and were beginning to ascend——when, from motives which I could not judge of; but wise motives no doubt, much better seen by a Commander in Chief than by any other man, a halt was commanded, and consequent retreat. In this retreat across the space, now forming the neutral ground between the two armies, as they gravely marched, the enemy recovering from their dismay by this abandonment of our enterprise, came

forward and galled our brave troops most bitterly.

I was in the front of our army at this time, on an eminence, and saw this scene, and many a shot came whistling by me. It was an afflicting scene: however, it ended, and orders were given to fortify our position defensively. I confess to you that my blood chilled on hearing this. I was told that the hill to which the French had retreated was fortified impregnably; that it lay under the fire of the fortified hill within the walls. That it could only be taken by regular siege. I could only submit. I could not argue against science.

But I was of opinion, having seen such a display of valour, such brilliancy of conduct, such unconquerable enthusiasm, such enterprise in our army, that we should have pursued our fortune further; knowing, as

I have had opportunity to know, that the Frenchman once dismayed (unless reinforced and with superior numbers) is hardly ever disposed to encounter his enemy again: knowing that they expected this reinforcement soon from Cairo, and possibly as soon from France—I was of opinion, I say, that we should have pursued our fortune on that day to a decision. I expressed myself so to many. I gave my opinion that we should attack them by night. The French cannot bear an attack by night: they cannot see to direct their artillery by night; and they will not stand the charge of your bayonet. You have conquered them. Attack them by night, or they will attack you by night. This was always my language when my opinion was asked. Other measures were adopted, and my business was to be reserved.

From this moment, the whole army

was employed in fortifying our camp: the heavy cannon were brought on shore. Some Arab Chiefs, whom I had sent to invite, came into the camp; and from these we got information of the state of the country, and promises of cattle and horses, and provision for the use of the army, which they executed with great fidelity.

The soldiers were too prodigal of their money, and too eager to be supplied. It required regulation. Sir Ralph Abercromby begged of me to undertake this task; and gave out in general orders, that the police of the market should be subjected to my discretion. I would do any thing for such men. I put things into a good train. The market was abundantly supplied, and the prices reduced to limits of conveniency to all parties. The General has said sometimes to the general officers about him: "The army, Gentlemen, are greatly indebt-

ed to Mr. Baldwin.” And I was proud of his approbation.

This went on till the 19th of March, when we found an interruption in the daily supply. It was Menou approaching with his army from Cairo. One Arab Sheck informed us, that he had left Cairo on the 17th, with nine thousand men. Another said, that he was already at Damanhur. Other reports said, that he had not quitted Cairo, for that he was afraid of the Vizir, who was arrived at Belbeis. Contradictory accounts, but enough in them to give us warning.

On the 20th, in the morning, at a great distance in the lake Mareotis, we saw considerable troops of camels, and an innumerable train of animals, passing towards Alexandria; but from the haze and vapour always floating over the exhaling lake, we

were not able to distinguish what. It was believed to be Menou, but I do not know if any particular information was obtained about it.

It turned out, in fact, to be Menou, with a reinforcement of nine thousand men from Cairo ; he reached Alexandria at noon, and the same instant took the command of the whole army. He made his dispositions for an attack the next morning, before day-light ; and punctually, on the 21st, as we were asleep came and roused us by a firing on our left. Out we jumped from under our tents ; and looking to the direction of the firing, we saw the flashing and heard the report of musquetry all along the left of our line.


The General immediately conceived it to be a feint. He said—this is only a feint ; but gave orders to every one of his aid-de-

camp to go upon some especial service. I was left alone with him. He kept saying to me—This is only a feint: they only mean to disturb us. And so repeating for five minutes—it is only a feint. But it was the forerunner of a real attack upon our front, from the centre to the right, with an army of fourteen thousand men, which at this instant opened with such a furious cannonading as to call up all our apprehensions.

The General says—it is an attack upon our right; give me my horse: and away he rode to the firing. I accompanied him as far as I could go on foot; but was very soon forced by the cannon-shot to retreat.

Our position in front was along a line drawn from the lake Aboukir on the left, to the sea on our right. From the lake is

a flat for about five hundred yards; then a rising ground for about a mile; then a valley of about six hundred yards; then a rising ground quite to the sea. As for example :—



1 An old ruin. 2 A battery,—no building. 3 Pit-holes. 4 Alexandrian Canal. 5 Lake Marcot.

The scope and jet of this attack was to cut off all our reserve, encamped from the centre to the right.

They had offered a Louis-d'or per man to any thousand who would undertake to turn our right, and take the battery which defended it. Bonaparte's invincible legion, consisting of nine hundred men, volunteered for this service.

At the same time that these should turn our right, the main body of the French army was to break our line in the centre, turn to the left, and envelope our reserve. At the moment this was executed, the French cavalry, fifteen hundred in number, were to charge the body so enveloped, and cut them to pieces.

The nine hundred of Bonaparte's invincible legion succeeded in turning our right

between the walls of a large ruin and our battery. They stormed the battery three times—and were three times exterminated to a man !

Our reserve, the forty-second and twenty-eighth, finding the enemy in their rear, faced about and charged them with the bayonet, and drove them backward step by step into the inclosure of the ruin. Six hundred and fifty of these invincibles were already extended upon the ground : the remaining two hundred and fifty called for quarter and obtained it. Not a man of them returned !—this was a business of twenty minutes.

At the time this was doing, the main body of the French army in a heavy column, broke through our line into the valley, and forced along the valley towards the rear of our camp. The cavalry accompanying this

movement, the instant they broke through our line, wheeled to their left, and directed their charge to the rear of our reserve.

But here too they were disappointed by a circumstance, not prepared by us with this design, nor expected by the French; a circumstance which, considering the share it had in delivering us from a most critical danger, will be ever impressivè on our minds.

You carry with you the charge of fifteen hundred cavalry in the rear of our line, and its alarming effects. Well! this charge was broke by the accidental state of the ground, over which the cavalry had to make their charge. It was all over excavated into pit-holes about three feet deep, with the sand raised about the banks another foot or two, as conveniencies for our

soldiers to sleep in, before the tents were landed for this service. The French charged over these holes, and were completely routed in its consequences, three hundred of them perished in this adventure.

Our reserve, completely disengaged from the most imminent hazard by these two ever-memorable events, faced about again to the enemy, with the centre of our army in the valley, and were in time to do more good service.

It was there the Commander in Chief was engaged in person. As he left me to go towards the cannonading, he must have rode straight among the enemy already broke into the rear of our front; and as it was not yet day, not being able to distinguish friend from foe, he undoubtedly had the misfortune to get embarrassed among them. But he was extricated by the va-

lor of his own troops. To the first soldier who came up to him, he said—soldier, if you know me, don't name me. He was rescued, and at this moment a French dragoon, conceiving the prize he had lost, rode up to the General amid his own guard, made a cut at him, and not being quite near enough, just cut through the coat and waistcoat, and shirt, and with the point of his sabre only grazed the skin. At the same moment the dragoon's horse wheeling about, he brought him to the charge again, and made a second attempt by a lunge; but the sabre passing between the General's side and his right arm, which he instantly closed. The dragoon being at this instant shot dead, the sabre remained in the General's possession. I was told that Sir Sidney Smith being beside him at the time, the General made him a compliment of this interesting arm.

About this time, it was perceived that the General had been wounded in the thigh, and was entreated to have it examined ; but —no ! it was a trifle he said, and would not for a moment disappear.

The conflict was very long after this ;—very obstinate ;—very fluctuating ;—very alarming. In some parts our ammunition was expended : we had some very questionable moments as to the result.

But the French, most probably wanting ammunition likewise ; wanting something, at least, which our brave army never relaxed in to the last, retreated.

Upon this event, the General whose exertions had kept him insensible to his weakness, retaining the efforts of his mind, giving way to a sentiment of rest, his spirits

seceding from their transport into calm—he fainted.

His wound was examined; a large incision was made to extract the ball. It could not be found. He was put upon a litter, and advised to be taken on board the *Foudroyant*.

It was in this state I first met him since the morning. He was in good spirits. He held his hand to me from the litter—Don't be concerned, Baldwin, he said to me, I shall soon be well. I could make no answer to him. I set down on the sand to bewail our misfortune.

In this state, not without hope, I was roused by a soldier to see the Frenchmen retreat, and I walked up to the front of our position upon an eminence, and saw them

gravely retreating in a long line, three deep. Across a valley of about a mile wide from the foot of our position to the rising of the hill on which they were encamped, did they gravely retreat. We returned them their civility to us on the 13th; and as they discovered the ground over which they passed, it was strewed with killed and maimed. They at length reached the foot of their own hill, and faced about to halt. I saw their General, riding from left to right of their line, knocked down by one of our twelve pound shot, just about the centre of the line. The horse got up again, but the General was killed. Thus ended the business of the 21st.

Shall we pause, and moralize upon this scene? Shall we ask, can the heart triumph at such a scene? It is not that the heart triumphs at such a scene, but that the scene,

in which our lives, our honour is at issue, is ended to our honour.

Is it no subject of triumph to vanquish, rather than to be subdued, rather than to be ourselves the victims in such a scene? Triumph is not delight! The heart cannot delight in such a scene: but to subdue an enemy, who would have subdued us, is some subject of consolation. See the countenance of a man looking on this scene: It is not joy that it expresses. It is more a relenting anxiety; more a solace from arduous care; more a sense of security from almost unavoidable danger, than even consolation. You see still a gloom, not yet dissipated by the confidence of the heart. It is no delight. It is a something like the assuaging of pain. It is comfort.

These victories make me melancholy, said poor Sir Ralph, when he was com-

plimented upon his victory gained on the 13th.

To see so many brave men go to death for their country ; so much the more to be admired ; so much the more to be regretted ; it does indeed make one melancholy ; but how are battles to be won ?

Poor Sir Ralph, under the torment of his wound, was, notwithstanding, always more concerned about the companions of his affliction. He had been two hours wounded, but would not withdraw from the field. Knowing the value of his presence, or judging with equal certainty the bad effects of his absence from the army at this critical conjuncture, he persevered. Not till the battle was won did he yield to the sentiment of his pain. When he saw the enemy retreat, he fainted. On the 28th he died.

If in the afflicted state into which I am plunged by the recollection of these scenes, the heart were free to expatiate, I could consecrate a grateful tribute to his memory. The victories he gained on the 8th, the 13th, and the 21st of March, will eternize his military fame; will ensure to his memory the gratitude of his country. If those actions are considered in their separate and characteristic essence; they will stand as models to the world.—The first for the cool and undaunted conduct of the army whilst going on shore, under such an explosion of fire exposed inactive in the boats; and their action and intrepidity when on shore. The second for its offensive skill and operation; and the third for its defensive stand, and invincible, and unresistible bravery in repelling as dangerous an attack as ever was attempted, and boldly conducted by the best of troops, acknowledged so to be by their victories over every other enemy

they had contended with, in the known world.

If considered as to their effects, they conquered Egypt to their country in these three actions. They conquered the spirit of an exalted and dangerous enemy. They have diffused a spirit of emulation among our own. They have honoured us. The sailors triumphed in the glory of the army. They rejoiced with them. The brave delight in the brave!

The good old Man being forced to quit the field, and head quarters (where I had had so long the happiness to live) being translated to the second in Command, I was, by some misunderstanding, although invited by General Hutchinson to remain, induced to return to the Foudroyant. It appeared to me also, as to the utility of my remaining a matter of real insignificance, since it was

evident that the army so shaken by the losses it had sustained in officers and men, had been forced by necessity into measures of merely defensive circumspection. The French, from all over Egypt were nearly concentrated at Alexandria, and within a line passing in front of the British position, at a distance of about a mile, from the Rosetta Gate of the ancient city, along the Aboukir road as far as the Alexandrian Canal, then over a bridge on the Canal to the edge of the Lake Mareot: thence turning to their right along the edge of the Lake, encompassing the Gardens on both sides of the Canal quite round the City, to the western environ of Alexandria.

The front of the British army, separated by a valley of about a mile, extended from the sea to where the Canal formed an elbow turning rather acutely from an east to a

southern direction, and fortified since with innumerable redoubts.

We possess the Lakes Aboukir and Maadie, and come with our armed launches quite up to the left of our front, and along the northern bank of the Canal.

There is little prospect that the French will, under the present circumstances, either attack us, or we them, although we are reinforced by about five thousand Turks. But we have it in our power, at any moment, to inundate the Lake Mareot, by cutting away part of the banks of the Canal, which serve to mound out the waters of the Aboukir Lake, higher in their level than the Lake of Mareot, (now dry,) by several feet; and of encompassing them so closely by these waters as to cut off their communication with the interior of Egypt, of course their supplies, and of annoying them

forely by our armed boats, and if advise-
able by frequent disembarkations of our
troops at unexpected points all around their
confinement. This may be done, I say, at
any moment we please. But we have it in
our power indefeasibly, if we must stay so
long as August*, to cut off their supply of
water from the Nile, and without water,
you know, they cannot subsist. I think the
French will be sensible of this their un-
avoidable term, and seek to capitulate; for
if the Turkish forces should accumulate:
If the enthusiasm of religion should rekindle
the degraded spirit of the multitude to re-
venge. If they should shake off the chain
of their oppression and arm to vengeance:
What respect shall restrain them? Shall the

* These reflections were read by Mr. Addington in
the House of Commons, immediately upon my arrival
in England, in May, the late intelligence from Egypt
will shew how correct an opinion had been formed of
the prospect of affairs at that time.

English restrain them?—I think they will see their danger and capitulate.

I have carried this description to its full length, in order to give you a token of my sincere regard, and out of respect and justice to the actors. A great deal of it is copied in fact from letters I had written while I was yet in Egypt; I could not tell the same story in two ways. I have pronounced that Egypt was conquered to England in these three memorable actions of the 8th, 13th, and 21st of March. The event will prove to you what value you may afford to put upon my political judgment. That you may see that the invasion of Egypt was not that unexpected event which the world conceived it to be, I have offered to your perusal what I wrote upon that subject so long as sixteen years ago, being called upon to give an opinion on the question, supposing the French could be meditating such

a design? I gave it under the title of “Speculations on the Situation and Resources of Egypt.” It is a work that is become very interesting since the execution of that design has confirmed the notions I had given upon the subject in the fullest extent.

A great question is naturally opened by these events, “Whether England ought to keep possession of Egypt, after having so nobly gained it by the valour of her arms?”

I see in the contemplation of this subject, a great deal to say, why England should keep it. But I see no room to hesitate in saying that England cannot, with advantage to the fluctuating state of power in Europe, without considerable wrong to herself, entirely relinquish the possession of it.

To conclude with a very favourite part of the story, and though last not least in this history of our atchievement in Egypt, I have to tell you that I was bearer of the famous Standard of the Invincible Legion of Bonaparte to London. It is the palm of numerous victories gained by this Legion, and which are inscribed thereon to their immortal honour. It was wrested from its brave inheritors, by the British on the field of the twenty-first of March, about four miles from the Rosetto Gate of Alexandria, after a gallant fight, in which they began assailants and ended defendants. —Of nine hundred of these brave soldiers, six hundred and fifty were extended upon the ground. The remainder, pressed by the bayonet of their victors into the inclosure of a ruin, were forced to cry for quarter. We gained their Trophy, and ever an honourable Trophy it will be to England, since it is the atchievement of greater

achievements? since it was won from the bravest warriors of the time.

Believe me to be with sincere regard,

Your affectionate Cousin,

GEORGE BALDWIN.

London,

May 19, 1801.

L E T T E R
TO THE
RIGHT HONOURABLE
H E N R Y D U N D A S,
ON THE EXPEDIENCY OF RETAINING
EGYPT UNDER THE CONTROUL
OF GREAT BRITAIN.

LETTER

TO THE

RIGHT HON. HENRY DUNDAS,

ONE OF

HIS MAJESTY'S PRINCIPAL SECRETARIES OF STATE,

&c. &c. &c.

SIR,

IN yielding to the general wish of my friends to be informed of the History, as far as I am able to inform them, of the late Invasion of Egypt, and of the circumstances which led to it, and which are likely to arise out of it; I have not hesitated to recur to papers, and memorials which were written at your request, and consequently owe their existence to your consideration and regard for me. I do not know if my doing it without your previous permission may stand in need of an apology; I would not have

done it, if I had thought so myself, but I will give for my apology, if I must give an apology, my motive ; and it is, “ That our country may know that such simple men as myself, and their opinions, are not disregarded by Ministers when they treat of events, however remote they may seem to be in prospect, if they appear to have any verisimilitude in argument, or foundation in fact.” And that you, Sir, have done me the honour to attend to these opinions particularly when the world was disposed to laugh at them ; and have availed of them, as the events have proved, to the honour and advantage of our country.

But, Sir, the political cauldron is compounding of greater events. More is foreboding : more “ hubble bubble ;” more “ toil and trouble.” It would require almost magical penetration to conceive it.

Will you allow me, Sir, to take up the thread of my discourse from the letter I had begun, but could not send from Naples; and to explain what I meant to say when I asserted that Bonaparte had touched upon the subversion of the Turkish Empire, and had only failed of it when he failed in his design upon Acri.

All Syria was suspended by the siege of Acri. The Mountains of Castravan, of Lebanon, of Cassius, were never completely subjugated by the Turk. The inhabitants are generally Maronita Christians. There is a nation called Meteveli, and another of Durzis. They are all of independent turn of mind: are all armed from the age of boys, and are governed by their own Emirs, or Sheicks, or Princes. I have been among them, and was acquainted with Emir Useff, and Emir Monfur, and Sheick Ali Jamblat, and many others. They are all

warriors, loving athletic exercises. They may be numbered at one hundred thousand fighting men.

Sir Sydney Smith appears to have known their importance. He corresponded with the chiefs of these men. They had been persuaded by Bonaparte; and Sir Sydney Smith reclaimed them from the course and purpose he had engaged them to adopt. Sir Sydney Smith encouraged them by his conduct. It was the conduct of a man inspired. People speak of the defence of Acri as of something prodigious: It *was* prodigious! The Alexander of the day, with his army of conquerors, was made heart-sick before Acri, by an handful of Britons. Acri, an atom before such a conqueror.

It is very true: and very fortunate for the world that he was stopped; for if he had

conquered Acri, all Syria would have submitted at the same instant of time. The Mountains would have declared for him, and he would have disposed of the arms, and of the reputation of his conquests, to subvert the Turkish Empire.

What would have been his next measure? His next measure would have been to conquer Asia Minor. You see him, Sir, by the conquest of Syria, at the defiles of Taurus.

I know this country too. I know it for more than thirty years to have been in a state of revolt. It is governed by independent Agas, or Chiefs of Districts; revolted from oppression; every man asserting and maintaining his own; giving property and freedom, and the energies of freedom to his adherents; and defending his estates with resolution and effect. In the exigencies of

war they have made common cause with the state; they have contributed a quota of men to the war; but upon no account have they suffered Pashas, or officers of authority to come among them to govern. They have no collective force; no concert, no co-operation, as to their general interest. If they had been threatened by the whole mass of power from Syria, what could they have done?

They could have done nothing. Bonaparte, would have softened their descent by a proclamation. He would have sent to them individually. “ You see that I have conquered Egypt, and Syria, and that nothing can resist my arms. I am at your door. I am marching into Asia Minor. I am marching to Constantinople. If you will live in your independency, I promise to maintain you in your independency, in your religion, and in your estates. If

you think that you can molest me in my progress; you will feel the weight of my desolating sword."

And they would have submitted; and Bonaparte would have marched triumphant to the boundary of Asia; to the confine of Europe. He would hence have looked down upon Constantinople.

I know, Sir, that you have already started at the dilemma of the Ottoman throne.—The natural retreat of the Turk, Asia Minor, cut off.—At his back an inveterate rebellion conducted by a desperate chief.—All around him defection, defection, defection—A prisoner in his Capital at the mercy of No Mercy! Need I proceed to the end?

Bonaparte saw all this; and from the mirror of his ambition, already saw him-

self reflected Arbiter of Turkey. He saw the Eagle blenching at his approach. What could then have stopt him? But luckily for the world, Acri stopt him. But Acri threw the monster on his back; but Acri exposed this Chimæra to the world. He turned about, but did not turn from his design. He carried it boiling in his stomach to France. He saw it practicable from another direction. He knew the weakness of mankind. He had skill and craft enough to abuse it. This is the æra of revolutions, he said to the army upon his return, and the army caught it, they swore to support him. They made him arbiter of their fate.

It is not an ordinary story of an ordinary mind, that can break at once through a cloud of disgrace, into such a sudden blaze of confidence and power; for the defeat at Acri was no inconsiderable defeat:

for the desertion of his companions of arms in the East, was not that commendable act which should recommend him to a further concession of confidence and power. It was the dismemberment of Turkey ; it was the fascinating effects of such a scheme upon the powers of Europe, that recommended him ; and indeed,

What a card to play off to avarice :
What a card to play off to ambition. Do we want more to account for the sudden reverse of Fortune in Italy ? Three and twenty fortresses surrendered by the same hand, that after so much waste of blood and treasure, conquered them !

So far advanced as this in his project, I did believe that he would have left England to her Expedition to Egypt. I did believe that he would have deduced the security of his Egyptian conquest, whether

mastered by the English, or not, among the necessary consequences of his expedition to Turkey. I did believe that he would have been sensible of the insurmountable difficulty of succouring Alexandria with a fleet; and that Gantheaume would have been employed to transport forces into Greece. I did believe all this, and said it; because I am apt to believe in the infallibility of these great men. This was, obviously to me, the game he ought to have played. It was tempting, it was open, it promised success; but he was lost in the danger of Egypt. He persisted in trying to save Egypt: and did not know that he was losing his time.

England had conquered Egypt before I left it: she had only to avail of the advantage she had gained. Gantheaume has been disappointed. The Republicans have not conquered Turkey. The moment perhaps is lost: The Northern Confederacy may be

otherwise disposed. Austria may now be otherwise disposed.—But the Greeks, he may say, are revolted in their hearts; but all Servia is in rebellion; but the Turkish power is a phantom. But I will attempt it yet.

Indeed the flood-gates of dominion seem every where to be wrenched: The waters are out: The land-marks are removed. God alone can tell when this afflicting spirit may subside.

The tendency of disorder is necessarily to dissolution; and a day will come when order will resume its reign.

I do not mean to be *particular* when I speak of the tendency of disorder. I mean to awaken our Policy to the general disorder of Europe. I think that France may not, at this time, find it so easy a task to accom-

plish her designs upon Turkey, but I think also that nothing can long protract the fall of that decaying Empire.

Upon this principle we cannot part with Egypt at any rate. To whom should we part with it? If there were sufficient reason to justify our sending an army into Egypt to expel the French, the same reason must exist for keeping them out. Then, how would you keep them out? Would you put the Turk in possession of it again? They cannot keep the French out. They could not keep them out before; and when the French were in, could they drive them out? Are arguments wanting to substantiate this? Is the Turk more powerful than he was?

But England has professed to recover Egypt for the Turk: and shall England wrest Egypt from the French, to rob it

from the Turk? Would this be acting the part of a faithful ally? But England did not send her armies to Egypt out of compliment to the Turk. England had an interest in wresting Egypt from the French; an interest, equivalent to the magnitude of the undertaking: And shall she abandon this measure of safety to her interest before she is sure to have accomplished the intent of it? If the Turk could have kept the French out, there would have been no want of the armies of England to drive them out. The Turk attempted with the whole force of his Empire, to drive them out; but the world is informed how miserably he was defeated. The Turk therefore is inadequate in power. Shall England then restore it to the Turk, who cannot by himself defend it? Shall England live exposed to the same danger again? Then what is to be done?

England should be ever faithful to her

principles. Faithful to her allies. England must say to the Turk, you shall have your Province. We will defend it for you. You shall have your tribute, as the Mamaluks were engaged to pay it. Did the Mamaluk ever remit to you any tribute? Could you force even the Mamaluk to pay to you his tribute? Then England will answer that your tribute shall be paid.—Then what will the consequences be to England?

I have said, Sir, in my speculations on Egypt, that she annually sent a thousand ships abroad with her superfluous productions. To enter into a detail of this commerce would surpass the bounds of a letter: but it may be to your satisfaction to know, “ that in rice, and grain, and coffee, and senna, and flax, and hemp, and sal ammoniac, and myrrh, and aloes; and gums of all kinds; and ivory, and safflower, and

hides, and indigo, and sugar, and an infinite variety of articles useful to our consumption and manufacture. A thousand cargoes may easily be composed, and annually imported from Egypt into England. Do I say a thousand ships? Yes! A thousand ships, and I have left out of my account the lake Natron: producing a salt, answering all the purposes of soda in bleaching, and in making of soap, equal to a thousand cargoes more, if required. All this will pre-suppose a want of European manufacture in an adequate proportion. Cloth, and shalloons, and Manchester goods, and baize, and blankets, and shawls: cutlery, iron ware, watches, lead, tin, tin-plates, tobacco, cochineal, and arms: gunpowder, and of every assortment that can be named. This I can speak of, from my experience and observation. This is what has been done. But if Egypt was protected from the tyranny which has oppressed

it; if the peasant could enjoy the fruit of his labour; if he had not to fear the display of his means; his means would enable him, and his spirit would prompt him, to indulge himself a little more in the conveniences and elegances of life. If Egypt could be improved, in any proportion to its susceptibility of improvement, I would not hesitate to say, that we might reckon upon a circulation of two thousand ships of commerce in one year from Egypt to the ports of England. Do we forget what Egypt was? I have seen what it is, Sir! The French have seen it, and know its worth. If it can be held to England; she may talk of jewels in her crown, but a brighter than this, she will not possess.

To pretend to say, in the fluctuating state of power in Europe at present, who shall fall, and who shall rise; who shall

be despoiled, and who shall divide the spoil; is not the purpose of my present address. A great disorder is near at hand. Those will fare best, who have best deserved. In this reflection, I feel most comfortable for honest England.

GEORGE BALDWIN,

London,

September 27, 1801.

THE END.

